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Court of Appeals Case No. CA 990833 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE STATE OF UTAH 
DON H. HAYCOCK, MARTHA J. SMITH 
RICHARD O. HAYCOCK, MARY LOIS 
PORTER 
Plaintiffs and Appellants, 
v. 
THE ESTATE OF ELLEN S. 
HAYCOCK; THE ADMINISTRATOR 
OF THIS ESTATE; AND BONNIE 
K. KAUFMAN, INDIVIDUALLY, 
AND, DOES 1 THRU 10, INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT^OURT OF APPEALS 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
HONORABLE SANDRA PEULER, JUDGE 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF 
DON H. HAYCOCK & ASSOCIATES 
7321 Westlawn Avenue 
Los Angeles, California 90045 
(310)641-3921 
(310)641-6638 Facsmilie 
REFERENCES TO PARTIES 
For clarity and continuity, the parties will be identified as follows: 
"Plaintiffs" shall be Appellants-Plaintiffs: Don H. Haycock, Martha J. Smith, 
Richard 0. Haycock and Mary L. Porter. 
"Defendants" will include Appellee-Defendants, the Estate of Ellen S. Haycock 
and her daughter Appellee-Defendant Bonnie L, Kaufman. 
"Bonnie" shall be Bonnie L. Kaufman" 
"Ellen" shall be Ellen S. Haycock 
"Obed" shall be Obed C. Haycock 
Other than Don H. Haycock, these plaintiffs did not join this lawsuit at the time it was 
filed because Don H. Haycock had not been granted attorney pro hac vice status at that time. 
This association has now been completed with Utah Attorney Ronald Ady. In prior pleading 
these plaintiffs had been joined as defendants only to be subject to the jurisdiction of the court in 
order to be part of any judicial resolution. They are all the children of Obed C. Haycock who died 
on December 10, 1983. 
Defendant Ellen S. Haycock is the second wife of Obed C. Haycock and the mother of 
defendant Bonnie L. Kaufman. 
There are no doe defendants. 
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3.0 STATEMENT OF LEGAL ISSUES 
Defendants Responding Brief raises the following legal issues: 
1. Did the "Memorandum of Change in Testamentary Plan," that Obed signed 
constitute an offer of a unilateral contract to Ellen to treat his children the same as her child 
Bonnie would be treated in the distribution of her estate, and, if so, 
2. Did the consideration Obed gave for this offer of a unilateral contract fail 
because Ellen Haycock disinherited Obed Haycock's children, and consequently, Bonnie is 
estopped from receiving any undistributed benefits from the Estate of Obed C. Haycock and the 
estate of Ellen Haycock is in breach of contract to Obed's children and liable for damages.. 
3. May a trial judge grant a summary judgment based only on a litigants failure to 
respond within the statutory ten (10) days without considering the material facts and without 
issuing any grounds for its ruling other than failure to timely respond. 
5. May a trial court refuse to consider a motion for summary judgment filed by 
plaintiffs under Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure because it was filed after the ten(10) 
day statutory time for response to the summary judgment filed by defendants. 
4.0 APPELLEES-DEFENDANTS HAVE MIS-INTERPRETED THE 
"STANDARD OF REVIEW," 
Appellees-Defendants mistakenly exit Jensen v. IHC Hospitals, Inc. 944 P.2d 
327, 337 (Utah 1997) for the following Standard of Review: "The appellate court reviews the trial 
court's grant of summary judgment for correctness, and accords not deference to its conclusions 
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of law" 
This is not the standard and such a standard is not expressed in Jensen. The 
correct standard of review is stated in Jensen on page 337, specifically "Because we are 
reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we view the facts in the light most favorable to the 
nonmoving party " (page 337, left column) A copy of Jensen is Addendum No 1) 
The conclusions of law is the standard of review as expressed in Schnrtz v. BMW 
of North America (Utah 1991) 814 P 2d 1108, 1111 which holds that a challenge to a summary 
judgment presents only conclusions of law because by definition, cases decided on summary 
judgment do not resolve factual issues (underlining added) 
To sustain a motion for summary judgment, the pleadings, evidence, admissions 
and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the losing party, must show that there is no 
genuine issue of material fact Such showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable 
possibility that the losing party could win if given a trial, (emphasis added) Judkm v. Toone 
(Utah 1972) 492 P 2d 980, 982 
5.0 APPLICABLE RULES AND STATUTES 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56 Summary Judgment, which provides 
(b) For defending party. A party against whom a claim, counterclaim or 
cross-claim or to obtain a declaratory judgment is sought, may, at any time, move 
with or without supporting affidavits for summary judgment in his favor as to all or 
any part thereof (emphasis added) 
(c) Motions and proceedings thereon. " The judgment sought shall be 
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rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions 
on file, together with with affidavits, if any, show show that there is no genuine 
issue of material fact. . . " 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 52 
(a) Effect. "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, . . . , the court 
shall find the facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon . . ." 
6.0 STATEMENT OF CASE 
Nature of Case, The following clarifications and corrections are made to 
Defendants "Nature of Case" in their responding brief (page 2) 
1. The "proposed estate planning documents" to which defendants refer are wills 
for both Obed and Ellen, and the "Memorandum of Change in Testamentary Plan," hereafter 
"Memorandum." (Letters of Attorneys Narrvel Hall at R-309 and Hal Swenson at R-109. 
2. Defendants' reference to Attorney Narrvel Hall of Ray, Quinney & Nebeker as 
"an independent attorney" is not correct. The responsible senior partner managing Obed and 
Ellen's testamentary documents in 1983 was Albert Bowen. Ellen Haycock had known him for, 
". . . a long, long, long, long time " Also her husband who died prior to 1964 had known him. 
"He was their friend for a long period of time " (Bonnie Kaufman's Deposition at 80/9 to 80/18 
and Facts No. 8.6.1 and 8.6.2 of Defendants' Opening Brief). 
3. It has not been proved that: "Obed and Ellen specifically discussed with Mr. 
Hall [Attorney Narrvel Hall] the concept of contractually limiting the rights of the survivor to 
dispose of their own assets as the saw fit and they [Obed and Ellen] rejected that concept." This 
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assertion was taken from a letter written by Mr Hall (R-309) which he also confirmed in his 
deposition However, the personal representative of Obed, his son Ralph Haycock, has given 
testimony that totally contradicts the assertions in Hall's letter and in his deposition He has 
testified that it was Obed and Ellen's expressed intention - without any limitations - that each of 
their estates go to all of their children in equal shares Also, Ralph Haycock testimony contradicts 
that of Hall's of the meeting of April 5, 1983 when Obed and Ellen signed their Restated Trust 
Agreements and Wills that Hall prepared (Addendum No 2) 
Ralph Haycock's recollection is stated in a letter he sent to Ellen on December 28, 
1983, or thereabouts, that states the following 
"The truth Ellen is that my father really did care The part that you refuse to suggest or 
even acknowledge is that you and my father made a secret covenant in the presence of Narrvel 
Hall In this covenant each of you promised that the wealth that was accumulated between the 
two of you, individually and collectively, at the time of death, would go to the surviving spouse 
The surviving spouse would in turn promise to leave what wealth was left over at his/her death to 
the six children [Obed's children and Bonnie Kaufman] " (Bonnie Kaufman's Deposition at 32/4 
to 35/5) 
5 Appellees mistakenly claim that the "Memorandum" was rejected by Obed and 
Ellen (page 3) Although Ellen claim that she rejected the "Memorandum" there is no proof that 
it was rejected by Obed and he signed it Conversely, there is undisputed evidence that his 
intention was that this "Memorandum" ensure that Obed and Ellen complied with the terms of 
their Restated Trusts and Wills that were prepared by Narrvel Hall and which they approved on 
April 5, 1983 
Course of Proceedings. Appellees-Defendants mis-state the allegations in the 
complaint by falsely stating that this lawsuit was to enforce " an oral covenant allegedly made 
by Obed and Ellen and 1983 " What the complaint alleges is the following 
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"He [Obed] stated that he and Ellen had discussed these concerns [that she would 
out live him] and made a "covenant" that he would leave everything to her, other than the 
Heber City farm, and that she would reciprocate by leaving their combined estates to his 
and her children in equal shares. He wanted to eliminate the Trusts of 1979 and asked 
plaintiff [Don Haycock] to prepare reciprocal documents that would accomplish this 
agreement with Ellen that he represented as a "covenant" with her. Plaintiff [Attorney 
Don Haycock] prepared their reciprocal wills and a "memorandum" expressing their 
"covenant." (Complaint, R-4 and Addendum No. 5, the Affidavit of Don H. Haycock) 
This is not a lawsuit to enforce an "oral covenant." Rather it is to enforce a the 
"Memorandum" that Obed signed to enforce this "covenant" with Ellen from which she benefitted 
under its terms, as restated in his Restated Trust Agreement, by entitling her daughter Bonnie to 
share equally with his children in his estate. (R-198) 
7.0 DEFENDANTS' MIS-STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendants Statement of Fact No. 4.. There is no dispute that what Don 
Haycock sent to Obed and Ellen in February 1983 was a will for each of them and the 
"Memorandum of Change in Testamentary Plan" (i.e. the "Memorandum") Defendants' vague 
reference to ". . . other estate planning documents . . . " is a false representation. (Letters of 
Narrvel Hall and Hal Swenson, R-309 and R-109) 
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 7. Attorney Hal Swenson reviewed the 
"Memorandum" and each of the wills Don Haycock had prepared. These are the so called 
"planning documents." (Letters of Narrvel Hall and Hal Swenson, R-309 and R-109), and he 
informed Ellen of his conclusion regarding the "Memorandum" from his review. R-105 
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 9. Defendants failed to include the 
following clarifying statement that Hall attributed to Obed regarding his alleged concern of a, 
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". . . contractual arrangement, somewhat similar to that proposed by Don . . . " (R-310) 
"Obed stated that he was satisfied with an arrangement which protected only the 
residue of his own assets for the children and that he did not want the children to be in a 
position to interfere with Ellen's use or management of those assets which were in her 
own name." (underlining added) R-310 
Hall does not attribute to Obed any expression or implication that contradicts the 
provisions expressed in the "Memorandum" which only limits his and Ellen's right to disinherit the 
other's child, or children. Nor does the "Memorandum" contradict the Restated Trusts and Wills 
Hall prepared and Obed and Ellen signed on April 5, 1983. According to Hall, Obed was only 
interested in Ellen's "use and management" of those assets while she was living. (R-309) 
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 10.. Appellant disputes that Ellen Haycock 
did not execute any writing in which she agreed that she would not change her estate planning 
documents concerning the treatment of Obed's children. She executed her "Amended and 
Restated Trust Agreement" on April 5, 1983. (Addendum No. 3) This document's caption 
represented to her that it constitutes both a trust, and an agreement to comply with the terms of 
the trust. One of the terms was that Obed's children and Bonnie would be treated equally in the 
disposition of her estate. (R-198) Obed executed a reciprocal Trust Agreement that provided for 
the same distribution of his estate. Either, or both, of these parties, by this caption, could 
reasonably conclude that these Trusts were agreements and the other party was bound by its 
terms. Also, there is no indication from defendants that Obed did not believe that this caption 
imposed contractual obligations on him and Ellen not to disinherit each other's children. 
(Addendum No. 3) 
Ellen's signature to a writing is not necessary for her to incur a contractual 
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obligation to Obed to either treat his children the same as Bonnie in the distribution of her estate, 
or that by her disinheriting Obed's children — relinquish the right of Bonnie to share in Obed's 
estate and be subject to damages for breach of contract She accepted the benefits Obed offered 
in the "Memorandum," and by doing formed a unilateral contract that obligated her to not 
disinherit Obed's children A unilateral contract is one in which a promise is given in exchange 
for some act, forbearance or thing Restatement of Contracts, chapter 12, J Corbm 21; 
Wilhston 3rd. section 13. 
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 20. Plaintiffs' Memorandum Opposing 
Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment that was served by Mail on July 11, 1999 On July 
26, 1999 defendants served their Reply Memorandum in support of their Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Opposition to Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (R- 281) Their Reply 
Memorandum should have been served within five (5) days under, URCP, Rule 4-501,of 
Plaintiffs' July 11, 1999 opposing Memorandum It was filed seven (7) days after it should have 
been filed There is no indication Judge Peuler reviewed and/or rejected this memorandum for not 
complying with this Rule 
Defendants' Statement of Fact No. 21. The cited grounds for the minute entry 
of August 6, 1999 was Plaintiffs failure to respond to Defendants' motion for summary 
judgment in the time allowed by the rules (R-312) The judgment was entered on September 1, 
1999 
Following the court's minute entry of August 6, 1999, Don Haycock on behalf of 
Plaintiffs served by mail on August 8, 1999 Plaintiffs' Reply to Defendants' Response to 
Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment (R- 315) On August 9, 1999 Haycock, on behalf of 
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Plaintiffs, took the depositions of Narrvel Hall and Obed's personal representative, Ralph 
Haycock. 
8.0 IT WAS AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION FOR THE TRIAL COURT 
TO GRANT SUMMARY JUDGMENT BASED ONLY ON A LATE 
RESPONSE TO A MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Judge Peuler's minute entry (R-312) of August 6, 1999 makes no reference to the 
factual issues or the underlining legal principles on which to base a motion for summary judgment 
Two days after issuing this minute entry Plaintiffs' filed their Reply Memorandum to Defendants' 
Motion for Summary Judgment Although Judge Peuler states that she "reviewed the pleadings 
filed in this matter," there is no indication what pleadings she reviewed or her conclusions, in any, 
that resulted from this review Her review should have included the pleadings evidence, 
admissions and inferences therefrom, viewed most favorably to the Plaintiffs and conclude that 
there is no genuine issue of material fact Judkm v. Toonc Utah 1972) 492 P 2d 980, 982 The 
affirmance of summary judgment on appeal is appropriate only where there exists no genuine 
issues if fact L&A Dnvwa/l Inc. v. Whit more Construction Co. (Utah 1980) 608 P 2d 626, 629 
Judge Peuler's review failed this standard 
In order to establish that there is no genuine issue of fact, a trial court's ruling on a 
summary judgment motion shall comply with the provision of Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) 
unless there is no dispute as to the facts Neenng v. Utah State Bar (Utah 1991) 817 P.2d 320. 
322 "In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury, , the court shall find the facts 
specifically and state separately its conclusions of law thereon, " Utah Rule of Civil 
- 8 -
Procedure 52(a) 
uAn important reason for inclusion of the requirements that the trial court state the 
ground for its decision in summary judgment cases is administrative in nature to provide a ready 
basis for review on appeal However, also from an administrative point of view, failure to state 
the grounds for its decision would not constitute a reversible error. Rather, in an appropriate 
case, failure to do so may only justify remand to the trial court " Neenng v. Utah State Bar (Utah 
1991) 680 P 2d 320, 323 
Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides 'The [summary] judgment sought 
shall be rendered if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, 
together with the affidavits, , show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact " 
Defendants cite Morse v. Packer (Utah 1999) 973 P 2d 422, 424 as authority on 
which a trial court can grant summary judgment for a tardy filing In this case the trial court 
judge granted summary judgment on a tardy response to a motion for summary judgment 
However, this issue was not appealed and is only cited as being part of the trial court record. 
There was no appellate decision on this issue and trial court decisions do not constitute 
precedents 
Even if the rules argumento permitted Judge Peuler to grant summary judgment on 
a tardy response to a motion for summary judgment, it must be based on a finding that " the 
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file, together with the 
affidavits, , show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact " URCP, Rule 
56(c) A mere recitation that the court "has reviewed the pleadings" fails this test 
There is no indication that Judge Peuler considered Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary 
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Judgment and Response to Defendant's Motion that was served on July 11, 1999 Under Rule 
56(c), Neenng (supra) these pleadings were part the record and should have been considered 
Also, Plaintiffs Reply Memorandum to Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment that was 
served on August 8, 1999 should also have been considered, even though the minute entry 
preceded it, because the judgment was not issued until September 1, 1999 There is no indication 
these filings were considered Certainly not considered was Plaintiffs' Reply Memorandum filed 
August 8, 1999 and probably Defendants'combined memorandum of July 11, 1999 because was 
seven-days late 
9.0 THE RECORD CITED BY PLAINTIFFS IS PROPERLY BEFORE 
THE APPELLATE COURT 
Defendant complains that the depositions on which Plaintiffs rely were not before 
the court when Judge Peuler issued her minute entry of August 6, 1999 and cite the following 
depositions that were taken subsequent to this date Narvell Hall's deposition of August 9, 1999, 
Ralph Haycock's deposition of August 9, 1999, and Bonnie Kaufman's deposition of November 
29, 1999 
Judge Peuler's minute entry on August 6, 1999 granted Defendants' summary 
judgment because Plaintiffs failed to file any responsive pleading within the time allowed by the 
rules There was no finding under URCP Rule 52(a) that there was no genuine issue of material 
fact and that defendants were entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law Neenng v. State 
Bar of Utah (Utah 1991) 817 P 2d 320, 322 & 323 It is therefore not relevant to argue the 
record that was before the trial court on August 6, 1999 because it was disregarded by Judge 
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Peuler in her minute entry of August 6, 1999. (R-312) and judgment of September 1, 1999. (R-
77) The discovery and pleadings continued beyond September 1, 1999. Under URCP Rule 
52(a) summary judgment should not be granted if discovery is incomplete since information 
sought in discovery may create genuine issues of material fact sufficient to defeat the motion. 
Downtown Athletic Club v. Ho/wan (Utah 1987) 740 P.2d 275, 278. 
Since no summary judgment has issued on the factual issues in this lawsuit, the 
minute entry of August 6, 1999 and the judgment of September 1, 1999 is not applicable to the 
issue of material facts that would support summary judgment. 
Defendants' claim that the deposition of Bonnie Kaufman was conducted in a 
related lawsuit and therefore was not part of the record. These lawsuits include the same parties, 
and involve the rights of litigants to the estates of Obed and Ellen. Both plaintiffs and defendants 
have elicited testimony for both cases in depositions irrespective of the case designation under 
which a deposition may have been noticed. There have been no objections by any of these parties 
to this practice The original certified copies of these depositions will be lodged with the court 
after all briefs are completed. 
All facts stated in plaintiffs' opening brief are fully reference to the page number 
and line in the applicable deposition Plaintiffs defer to the appellate court to determine if any of 
these facts, "mischaracterize statements or take statements out of context." 
10.0 DEFENDANTS' PERSONAL ATTACK ON ATTORNEY DON 
HAYCOCK IS FRIVOLOUS 
Defendants' contends that the word "conspired" in Haycock's representation of 
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the court's ruling of April 20, 2000 was not part of the ruling made by the court in its oral 
pronouncement of summary judgment to the companion case. Haycock has explained to the 
court that the transcript of the oral proceedings was received after plaintiffs' opening brief was 
served. And that the word "conspiracy" was mistakenly concluded from Haycock's handwritten 
notes taken while Judge Wilkinson was dictating the ruling in open court. Haycock has 
apologized to the court for this error. However, Judge Wilkinson has not yet issued an order and 
Haycock has petition this court to include word "conspiracy" as Haycock believes is proved by 
the facts. The undisputed facts are irrefutable that Bonnie Kaufman, Ellen Haycock and Narrvel 
Hall did conspire to "cover-up" or hide from the children of Obed Haycock the fact that Obed and 
Ellen Haycock executed and notarized a tenancy-in-common deed in order that Ellen could 
clandestinely take title to their residence as a surviving joint tenant under a prior joint tenancy 
deed. Narrvel Hall prepared the necessary documents to accomplish this. Civil conspiracy is 
defined as follows: 
"The essence of civil conspiracy is a concerted action or combination to 
defraud or cause other injury to person or property, and which results in damages 
to the person or property of the plaintiff. Connors v. Bryce 170 N.Y.S. 94, 95. 
In defense of this accusation Haycock has filed with the State Bar of Utah the 
charge of misconduct against Narrvel Hall for engaging in this conduct while employed by the 
personal representative of Obed's estate, Ralph Haycock. This charge is Addendum No. 4. It 
was filed and is offered in this brief solely in defense of Defendants' frivolous personal attack. 
11.0 NARRVEL HALL'S TESTIMONY IS NOT CREDITABLE AND 
BIASED AGAINST PLAINTIFFS 
- 12-
Defendants' contentions that Obed was agreeable for Ellen to disinherit his 
children are based on the testimony of Narrvel Hall from his alleged conversations with Obed and 
Ellen in preparation of their Restated Trust Agreements and Wills (Addendum No 3 and R-198), 
and, the meeting of April 5, 1983 when they signed these documents He contends that Obed and 
Ellen were told to destroy the "Memorandum" and Wills sent to them from Don Haycock in 
February 1983 Also, that Obed and Ellen rejected the concept of contractually obligating their 
estates to treat all of their combined children equally These assertions of Hall are based on a 
letter Hall wrote on February 9, 1984 in response to the "Memorandum" and Wills prepared by 
Don Haycock that Ellen sent him in February 1984 (R-309) 
A month later, in February 1984, Hall, in concert with Ellen and Bonnie 
clandestinely secreted from the personal representative of Obed's estate, and all of Obed's other 
children, the fact that Obed and Ellen had taken title to their residence as tenants-in-common via 
an unrecorded tenancy-in-common deed Also, in concert with Bonnie and Ellen, Narrvel Hall 
arranged for Obed and Ellen's residence to be transferred to Ellen via by a prior joint tenancy 
deed The fact that this deed was not recorded does not excuse this conduct Hall was the 
attorney for Obed's estate and this conduct violated multiple ethical standards of professional 
conduct Hall had an ethical obligation as an attorney to disclose to the personal representative of 
Obed's estate, this tenancy-in-common deed, this cover-up and this transfer of the residence to 
Ellen He did not do this and the recorded joint tenancy deed was discovered in 1998 (see 
Addendum No 4) 
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12.0 NARRVEL HALL'S TESTIMONY IS REFUTED BY THE 
DEPOSITION TESTIMONY OF OBED'S PERSONAL 
REPRESENTATIVE RALPH HAYCOCK 
Regarding Obed and Ellen's Restated Trust Agreements of April 5, 1983 
(Addendum No 3 and R-198) and the meeting on this date when Obed and Ellen signed their 
Restated Trust Agreements and Wills, Ralph Haycock responded as follows to the following 
questions in his deposition (Addendum No 2) 
Question You are also, as I believe, the alternative trustee for the trust of 
Ellen Haycock of that same date [April 5, 1983} 
Answer That's right 
Question To refresh your memory, do you recall that the trust[s] provide that 
the assets of the last to die shall be distributed equally to Ellen 
Haycock's children and Obed Haycock's children 
Answer That's correct 
Question Do you recall that, if this was the intention of your father, Obed 
Haycock? 
Answer Yes, that was his intention 
Question Do (sic) you have any conversation with him regarding this? 
Answer Yes 
Question Do you recall specific conversations? 
Answer Before his death, during the summer of 1983,1 spent considerable 
amount of time with Obed, my father, and it was his position that 
his estate was set up so that when he died, certain things would go 
to Ellen, certain things would be divided between his children And 
the when Ellen passed away, she would reciprocate and divide the 
remaining - what remains after her death would be equally divided 
between the children, all the children, including the Haycock 
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children and her children " 
Question Do you recall any occasions when Ellen was present when this 
subject was brought up? 
Answer In the - when we signed the will on that date -
Question That date, you are referring to April -
Answer April the 5th, he - they both expressed that that's what they wanted 
to do That they both mentioned that, "yes, this is what we want to 
do" 
Question And who was in the meeting at that time? 
Answer Well, as I recall, I was there and Narrvel Hall was there, Obed and 
Ellen, and I think Bonnie [Bonnie Kaufman] was there, but I'm not 
sure I can't remember, but I thought she was present also 
Question Did either of them place any limitation on this intention? 
Answer No 
Mr Payne Objection, vague 
Question okay, when this intention was expressed, was it expressed before 
Narrvel Hall 
Answer Yes 
Question Do you remember any words that Obed may have spoken at that 
time? 
Answer It's been 16 years ago All I remember is they expressed their 
intent to do that, both of them did The words they used, it's been 
to long ago to remember the exact words 
Question Did Ellen Haycock say anything to the effect that she would 
disinherit Obed's children if any mistreated her? 
Answer No, that was not mentioned 
Ralph Haycock's recollection of Obed's intention is stated in a letter he sent to 
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Ellen on December 28, 1983, three weeks after Obed's death, that states the following-
"The truth Ellen is that my father really did care The part that you refuse to 
suggest or even acknowledge is that you and my father made a secret covenant in the 
presence of Narrvel Hall In this covenant each of you promised that the wealth that was 
accumulated between the two of you, individually and collectively, at the time of death, 
would go to the surviving spouse The surviving spouse would in turn promise to leave 
what wealth was left over at his/her death to the six children [Obed's children and Bonnie 
Kaufman] " (Bonnie Kaufman's Deposition at 32/4 to 35/5) 
Ralph Haycock's testimony factually contradicts Narrvel Hall's testimony that 
"Obed stated he was satisfied with an arrangement which protected only the residue of his own 
assets for the children " And that " they both made it very clear that, while, Ellen fully 
intended to treat her daughter Bonnie and Obed's children equally, her assets were her own and 
she was not to be under any legal disability with respect to their use, management or disposition 
(Underlining added) (R-310) 
There is no dispute that the "Memorandum" does not limit Ellen's use or 
management of the funds in her estate - it only limits her right to disinherit Obed's children 
Ralph Haycock's testimony directly contradicts Hall's testimony in this regard and supports Obed 
signing and retention of the "Memorandum" to ensure that Ellen would comply with their 
undisputed intention that it expressed when she died Obed's intention is not disputable because 
he did not change his testamentary plan to disinherit Bonnie and his intention is clearly that he did 
not want to favor Bonnie over his own children as Hall implies he did (R- 287) 
Hall has not produced any evidence of what "contractual relationship" was 
discussed with Obed and Ellen Only that it was "somewhat similar to that proposed by Don " 
Hall did not know what Don Haycock had presented at the time this alleged "contractual 
relationship" was discussed According to Hall, Obed's concern was - not the distribution of 
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Ellen's estate - but that the children not interfere with the property she received from Obed 
during her lifetime There is no indication in Hall's letter (R-309) that Obed is withdrawing from 
his and Ellen's intention that their estates shall go to all of their children equally 
When Obed signed the "Memorandum" he formalized this oral agreement between 
him and Ellen by offering her a unilateral contract that if she would treat all their children equally 
in her estate, he would do the same A unilateral contract is one in which a promise is given in 
exchange for some act, forbearance or thing An offer to enter into a unilateral contract does not 
require notice of acceptance, it is the act that constitutes acceptance Restatement of Contracts, 
chapter 12, 1 Corbm 21; Wilhston 3rd. section 13. Consideration to a unilateral contract may be 
a benefit conferred on a third person Cechetti v. Consumers Associates (Cal 1968) 260 CA 2d 
295, 298 When a contract is unilateral and has been fully performed by the one of the parties, the 
remaining promise is taken out of the Statute of Frauds and may be enforced against the other 
party Blaustem v.Barton (Cal 1970) 9 CA 3d 161, 185 
13.0 OBED HAYCOCK DID NOT DESTROY THE "MEMORANDUM" 
AND WITH IT INTENDED TO ENFORCE ITS TERMS THAT ALL 
CHILDREN BE TREATED EQUALLY. 
Defendants cite the several times Narrvel Hall allegedly told Obed to destroy the 
"Memorandum" and conclude he must have destroyed it There is no poof that he destroyed it 
and the only reasonably inference is that he did not destroy it It was most likely acquired by 
Ellen and Bonnie when they removed items from his safety deposit box in advance of Obed's 
personal representative R-223 The scenario on which Defendants rely to advance this 
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destruction theory is as follows: 
(1). On March 15, 1983 Obed, Ellen, Narrvel Hall and Senior Partner Albert 
Bowen met to discuss Obed and Ellen's estate plan. During this meeting there was a discussion 
about a document (incorrectly identified as a will) Obed signed about a month previously, that his 
son Don Haycock had prepared. Narrvel Hall told Obed and Ellen to destroy this document as 
soon as they got home. (Addendum No. 6) 
(2). On April 5, 1983 after Narvell Hall had prepared Obed and Ellen's trusts and 
wills, Obed again informed Narrvel Hall that he had signed a document prepared by Don. R- 309 
The implication of this evidence is that Obed had not followed Hall's instructions 
of March 15, 1999 to destroy the 'Memorandum" nor is there any proof he followed Hall's 
instructions of April 5, 1983. 
Narrvel Hall does not know if Obed and Ellen destroyed the "Memorandum" that 
Obed signed. 
Narrvel Hall contradicts the testimony of Ralph Haycock by asserting that in his 
conversation with Obed and Ellen ". . . their instructions [to him] were that the survivor would 
have the right to disinherit their children for any reason at all as to the assets of that individual." 
(Addendum No. 7 page 27) Narrvel Hall recommended that they not pursue the plan of a "joint 
and contractual plan of disposition." (Addendum No. 7, pages 29 -30) In 1979 Obed's intention 
that all children be treated equally was expressed in his will of June 28, 1979 by the following 
provision: 
"[If] Trustor's wife [Ellen] has preferred the living descendants of Trustor's wife 
over the living descendants of Trustor or has preferred one of Trustor's living descendants 
over one of Trustor's other living descendants, then Trustee shall divide the remaining 
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trust estate into as many equal shares as the sum of (i) the number of Trustor's the living 
children and (ii) the number of Trustor's deceased children who have living descendants " 
(R-297) 
It was not only Obed's intention that all children be treated equally, but he 
expressed this in writings that he has signed Defendants have offered no evidence that these 
writings were ever revoked by him 
Plaintiffs' have met their burden of proof and the burden now shifts to defendants 
to refute this proof- which they have failed to do It is relevant that Ellen and Bonnie invaded 
Obed's safety deposit box before his personal representative could inventory the contents (R-
223) Had Obed destroyed the "Memorandum" Defendants would know, but they remain silent 
Hall made no effort to have Obed and Ellen produce the "Memorandum" so that 
he could assess its legal effect In his depositions he claims that he assumes it was a will that 
Obed signed and the Restated Trust and Will Obed signed on April 5, 1983 would invalidate it 
Obed knew that he had signed the "Memorandum" and knew it was not a will Both Bonnie and 
Hall have testified that he was mentally competent at the time he signed these documents on April 
5, 1983 Obed also knew that the terms of the "Memorandum" were precisely incorporated into 
the Restate Trust Agreement he signed on this date - and that neither the trust or will he signed 
on this date would invalidate this "Memorandum " Ellen was also present at the March 15, 1983 
meeting and the April 5, 1983 meeting when Obed's signing of the "Memorandum" was 
discussed The legal significance of the "Memorandum" had been explained to her and Obed by 
Attorney Hal Swenson before the March 15, 1983 meeting with Hal and Bowen With this 
knowledge, she did not give it to Hall, nor did Obed, for formal rejection 
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14.0 DEFENDANTS' RELIANCE ON JACKSON V. JACKSON IS NOT 
APPLICABLE 
Defendants' cite Jackson v. Jackson in support of the contention that the Statute 
of Frauds in effect in California in 1953 barred an inheritance under an oral contract (page 14) 
However, the Statute of Frauds cited in Jackson was revoked in both California and Utah in the 
1980's Utah replaced it with Utah Probate Code, sections 75-2-701 & 75-2-514 and California 
also adopted the same provisions in their Probate Code (see Plaintiffs' opening brief)) 
15.0 DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE ON GONZALEZ V. SATRUSTEGUIIS 
NOT APPLICABLE 
Defendants cite Gonzalez v. Satrustegui in support of the contention that the 
Statute of Frauds will be enforced if applicable (page 15) This is an Arizona case that has ruled 
on the applications of two Arizona statutes having to do with execution of wills Plaintiffs are 
unable to find and reference to the Arizona Statute of Frauds, or what this statute expresses and 
Defendants' did not include any reference in their responding briefs 
16.0 DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE IN ESTATE OFSOMOGYI V. 
MAROSITES IS NOT APPLICABLE. 
Defendants incorrectly cites Estate ofSomogyi v. Marosites, a Florida case in 
support of the contention that a court will grant judgment on the pleadings where the complaint 
did not allege a written agreement to make a will (page 15) This case holds that where a 
husband and wife reduce an oral agreement to make reciprocal wills to a writing and then reduce 
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this agreement to one mutual will signed by both, it will be enforced over a subsequent will made 
by one of the parties revoking the joint will. 
17.0 DEFENDANT'S RELIANCE ON DICKIE V. DICKIE IS NOT 
APPLICABLE 
Defendants incorrectly cite Dickie v. Dickie, an Oregon case, for the alleged 
proposition that, " the reference to "decedent" in an Oregon statute of fraud provision, is intended 
to apply to the person against whom the agreement to make a will or devise is sought to enforce." 
(page 16) In this case a father and son entered into a contract that in consideration for the son's 
transfer to the father of his one-quarter remainder interest in a piece of real estate, in which the 
father held a life estate, the father agreed to leave that real estate to the son in his will. 
Sebsequently the father conveyed his interest to a third party The court held that there was a 
valid contract between the son and father, and the father breached the contract by selling the real 
estate during his lifetime. This issue was whether the father can be held in breach for an inter 
vivos transfer. The court held he could and it was not necessary for him to be a "decedent." 
This case has no application to California Probate Code, sections 75-2-701 & 75-2-514. 
18.0 OBED RELIED ON ELLEN'S REPRESENTATIONS AND ACTS 
THAT SHE WOULD NOT DISINHERIT HIS CHILDREN 
During the latter years of Obed's life, Ellen have no indication to him that she 
would not honor their intention, that turned into a unilateral contract and then a bilateral contract. 
She knew the legal effect of the "Memorandum" that he signed (R-105) and was troubled that by 
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the terms of this "Memorandum" she would have to share her estate with his children as Attorney 
Hal Swenson had explained to her So she went to an old friend, Albert Bowen of Ray, Quinney 
& Nebeker in an effort to kill the legal effect of this "Memorandum " She persuaded them to 
incorporate the testamentary plan expressed in the "Memorandum" into hers and Obed's Trusts -
minus the contractual obligations since she knew Obed was dying (see Opening Brief) and would 
not make any changes 
She knew that the references Hall made to the "Memorandum" as a 
"planning"document, or will, or codicil were false, but she did not identify to him what this 
document really was and did, as she had been told by Attorney Swenson If Obed had really 
changed his mind about her having the right to disinherit his children - she would have given this 
"Memorandum" to Narrvel Hall for formal destruction She chose not to because it was not 
Obed's intention to disinherit his children 
19.0 DEFENDANTS MISREPRESENT OBED AND ELLEN'S 
FINANCIAL STATUS 
Defendants represent that both Obed and Ellen had their own assets and each was 
free to dispose of them as they wished (page 21) The implication of this representation was that 
Ellen had assets apart from what Obed gave her The facts are that other than Ellen's 
contribution to their residence, her assets came from Obed Although irrelevant to the issues 
before this court, this assertion falsely characterizes the financial contributions each of these 
parties brought to the marriage Addendum No 8 is a letter from Ray, Quinney & Nebeker that 
defines these parties financial status in 1979 At this time Ellen's estate was one-half of her 
- 2 2 -
interest in their residence which was then held in joint tenancy. This letter is included only to 
correct this misrepresentation. 
20.0 CONCLUSION 
Contrary to Defendants' responding brief, there was a contractual relationship 
between Obed and Ellen at the time of his death in 1983. The "Memorandum" he signed in 
February 1983, or thereabouts, both affirmed his intention that all children be treated equally in 
each of their estate the he first expressed in his will of 1979, and memorialize in writing a 
unilateral offer to Ellen that in consideration for his commitment to this disposition of his assets, 
she would do the same Up until his death, this was a unilateral contract wherein a promise was 
exchanged first for an act by Ellen to execute the Restated Trust Agreement Hall prepared for her 
in 1983, and then forbearance not to revoke that agreement, which she did a year later. Upon 
Obed's death this unilateral contract became a bilateral contract. Obed had fully performed his 
promise. A unilateral contact that has become fully performed on one side becomes a bilateral 
contract. (Where the contract in unilateral has been fully performed by one party, the remaining 
promise is taken out of the statute of frauds, and the party who performed may enforce it against 
the other. Restatement of Contract, Sec. 198; 2 Cor bin, Sec. 457 & 458; 3 Williston 3d. Sec. 
504; A.L.R.2d. 1053; 49 A.LR2d. 1293,1296) That this offer was repeatedly communicated to 
Ellen cannot be disputed. Obed's signing of his Restated Trust Agreement and Will in 1983 
cannot be a revocation of this offer - it is rather another written confirmation of this offer. 
Defendants' arguments fail that Equitable Estoppel and Promissory Estoppel are 
not applicable because they are based on there being no contractual relationship. 
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As third party beneficiaries of this contract, Plaintiffs are entitled to enforce this 
contract both against the Estate of Ellen Haycock and her personal representative, Defendant 
Bonnie Kaufman. 
Whether, or not, Obed expressed to Narrvel Hall that Ellen was at liberty to 
dispose of her estate in any manner she desired, as Hall claims, or whether there was an 
unconditional commitment to Obed that she honor the terms of their Restated Trust Agreements 
of April 5, 1983 as Ralph Haycock has testified - is a factual issue. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Don H. Haycock, Attorney pro hac vice 
for Plaintiff, and in pro se 
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JENSEN v. IHC HOSPITALS, INC. Utah 
Cite as 944 P.2d 327 (Utah 1997) 
1. Statutes *»188,223.2(.5), 223.4 
Sherry JENSEN and Shayne Hipwell, indi-
vidually and on behalf of all other heirs 
of Shelly Hipwell, and Ashley Michele 
Hipwell and Kaycie Shaylene Hipwell 
appearing by Shayne Hipwell as guard-
ian ad litem, Plaintiffs, Appellants, and 
Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., dba McKay-Dee 
Hospital, and Michael J. Healy, M.D. 
and Does I through X, Defendants, Ap-
pellees, and Cross-Appellant. 
No. 950164. 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
April 4, 1997. 
Opinion Granting Rehearing 
Aug. 22, 1997. 
Keheanng Denied Sept. 25, 1997. 
Patient's family sued physician and hos-
pu! for wrongful death arising out of medi-
r%\ malpractice. The Third District Court, 
«va)t Lake Division I, Glenn Iwasaki, J., 
fronted summary judgment for defendants 
* limitations grounds. Family appealed. 
TV Supreme Court, Zimmerman, C.J., held 
»hat (1) wrongful death claims were gov-
rmei\ by two-year statute of limitations for 
**<<iieal malpractice actions; (2) limitations 
HTHKI began running when plaintiffs discov-
er*!, or should have discovered, underlying 
njun, (3) genuine issue of fact as to wheth-
er ph>Mcian's fraudulent concealment tolled 
•utute of limitations precluded summary 
judgment; (4) patient's children were not 
rtiiitJtHl to bring wrongful death claim such 
tX*t they were not entitled to provisions of 
v*hng statute; on motion for rehearing; (5) 
fwsuine issues of fact existed as to whether 
Oman's alleged fraudulent concealment 
*XJM be impute to hospital so as to toll 
Stations period on claim against hospital; 
•d ft) family did not present evidence to 
*rp»rt constructive fraud claim against hos-
**1 and thus such a claim could not toll 
ksaitions period. 
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and 
**wded. 
.When faced with two statutes that^ntrr 
port to cover same subject, Supreme^GoWt 
determines legislature's intent as to which 
statute applies by following general rules of 
statutory construction, which provide both 
that best evidence of legislative intent is 
plain language of statute and that more spe-
cific statute governs instead of more general 
statute* 
2. Physicians and Surgeons e=»l8.15 
Two-year statute of limitations govern-
ing medical malpractice actions covered, ac-
tion by patient's family for wrongful 4eath 
arising out of medical malpractice. U.CA 
1953, 78-14-4. 
3. Death <3=»39 
Statute of limitations applicable to 
wrongful death claims arising out of medical 
malpractice begin to run at time patient or 
plaintiff discovers or, through use of reason-
able diligence should have discovered the 
injury, whichever first occurs. U.CA1953, 
78-14-4. 
( 
4. Death ®=>39 
Absent any reason to toll two-year stat-
ute of limitations governing deceased pa-
tient's medical malpractice claims, patient's 
family could not bring survival claim, where 
statute had run by time patient died. U.C A* 
1953, 78-11-12; 78-1&-37, 78-14-4.• 
5. Judgment «=»181(7) 
Genuine issue of fact as to wneuier pny-
sician's alleged fraudulent concealment pre-
vented patient's family .from inquiring into 
possibility of medical malpractice on part of . 
physician and hospital precluded suitunfity 
judgment in favor of physician and hospital , 
on statute of liimtaU6r '^ grotnidsinvfei^y'^ 
wrongful death action arising out rf medical 
malpractice. U,CJLlfik,?W4-4 °JT< *, -
6. Death <s=»39 !' " ' '•d ' r'pf Tx ''*""* '<<? 
Deceased patient'^  Jtyinor children werp 
not entitled to faring \M^IOA T^ri^^^K^ 
death because patient k}$ipjtyrA » - **» 
ian at time of her deajh, micK 
statute did not prevent statufe o ^ L _ 
jfeNSEN v. IHC 
Cite •• 944 P.2d 
Inst, 782 P.2d 506, 509, 511-12 (Utah 1989) 
frejecting attempts to recast claim for dAm-
ures arising out of regulators' licensing deci-
sion as claim for negligence to avoid govern-
^ntal immunity). 
In conclusion, we hold that Shelly's fami-
ly's wrongful death claims are governed by 
the two-year statute of limitations for medi-
cal malpractice actions contained in section 
Tg-14-4 of the Utah Code. We further con-
clude that the limitations period starts run-
mng when the patient or plaintiff discovers, 
or through the exercise of due diligence 
<bou!d have discovered, the underlying injury 
IM\ its origins in medical malpractice. We 
rvmand this case for a factual finding as to 
* hither Shelly's family's claims of fraudulent 
concealment will toll the statute of limitations 
AH to their wrongful death and survival 
claims We hold that the deceased's children 
A,n» not entitled to bring a wrongful death 
'.urn because their mother had a guardian 
4|»|M>mted at the time of her death and thus 
•V children were not entitled to the provi-
sos of the tolling statute. Finally, we hold 
that Shelly's family's claims for common law 
fraud are also governed by the two-year 
nulled malpractice statute of limitations 
'mind in section 78-14-4 and decline to reach 
•l)i lr claims of the unconstitutionality of this 
*V,Kling of the statute. 
RISSON, HOWE, EVES, and 
H U.LIDAY, JJ., concur in Chief Justice 
ZIMMERMAN'S opinion. 
Having disqualified themselves, Associate 
<"hicf Justice STEWART and Justice 
OI'RHAM do not participate herein; District 
Jodjre J. PHILLIP EVES and District 
Judge BRUCE K. HALLIDAY sat. 
On Petition for Rehearing 
This court now grants rehearing and issues 
tiu* opinion without hearing oral argument. 
*luh 1988), State v Amicone, 689 P 2d 1341, 
H44(Ulah 1984) 
*t uc recently noted in Monson v. Carver, we 
**\ rrfuse to address a claim of unconstifution-
*ht\ uhere the party making the claim has failed 
» make the requisite showing to support the 
<tom 928 P.2d 1017, 1024 (Utah 1996). *' '[A] 
ftvxwing court is entitled to have the issues 
cW»H\ defined with pertinent authority cited and 
* fwt simply a depository in which the appealing 
HOSPITALS, INC. Utah 
327 (Utah 1997) 
We address wheiher we should upHold'&i 
mary ' judgment" Ifi i^or 'WVA&^SL^ 
McKay-Dee' H o 8 p f ^ u ' ( ^ c ^ l ) ^ c W 
cause ^ plaintiffs Shayne_ Hij>Well* Sto4 Sftefrj^ 
Jensen's wrongful death 'action.Jla^unslr 
McKay-Dee was'barred by the meaicaf ttial-
practice statute o{% limitations, 4[&ee^ tftsuV 
Code Ann. § 78-14-4.
 ( In our^  prior opinidn^ 
in this case, we reversed, th€| [trial "court's J 
grant of summary judgment as w^al^  defen^ 
dants and remanded on the is§ue or
 iwhether,) 
defendant Michael J. Healy's ("Dr. Healy")' 
alleged fraud in collaborating with plaintiffs* 
original attorney was sufficient to toll the. 
statute of limitations on their medical mal-
practice claims once they had retained an 
independent attorney. Jensen v. IHC 
Hosps., Inc., 944 P.2d 327, 337 (1997). We 
further held that Jensen and HipwelTs at-
tempt to recharacterize tneir medical mal-
practice; wrongful death claim as a claim for 
fraud was not sufficient to avoid the two-
year medical malpractice statute of limita-
tions. Id at 337. In its petition for rehear-
ing, McKay-Dee now claims that summary 
judgment in its favor should have been up-
held because (i) Dr. Healy^ fraud does not 
toll the statute of limitations as to Jensen 
and Hipwell's claims against McKay-Dee; 
and (ii) Jensen and HipwelTs allegations of 
fraud oh the part of McKay-Dee were prop-
erly dismissed by the trial court. 
We begin with a brief review of tbtf faets 
relevant to our decision on'rehearing Be-* 
cause we are reviewing a grantxrfsttfhmary 
judgment, we view the facts in the light1 most 
favorable to the nonmoving parties, Jensen 
and Hipwell. Id at 328. Jensen and Hips 
well allege that Dr. Healy, Who ha#<*rtAff 
privileges at McKay-Defc but was u&'&tfff 
ployed by McKay-Dee, coimnitted^na^racv 
tice on Shelly HipwBU'<Jeh^*8/dat^tw 
and HipwelTs wtfe), while shp l^^jutieo^At 
party may dump the ourden of arj^merft aM 
research/" Id. (quoting Butter, 90^-JP.iW at 
230-31) (additional xjtations omitte4).\ ^ t h i s 
case, as in Monson, we are particularly J o ^ Jo 
•address a claim of, unconsuUitionatfty <rf a «1*tutt 
where the outcome wotJd'tritkally depm^.^ii 
factual research?} into thft effetaven^sVofflwtfe 
differing* statutes of limitations in furthering She 
legislature's purported goals.,*^ / **/'R?1?^$&%* 
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* * * 
IN THE MATTER OF THE 
ESTATE OF 
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Deceased. 
Civil No. P83-1229 
Deposition of: 
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BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 9th 
day of August, 1999, commencing at the hour of 
11:00 a.m., the deposition of RALPH H. HAYCOCK, produced 
as a witness, in the above-entitled action before the 
above-named Court, was taken before Jill Dunfotd, a 
Certified Shorthand Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and 
Notary Public in and for the State of Utah, at the 
offices of Depomax Reporting Services, 525 Wells Fargo 
Plaza, 170 South Main Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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SEP 
^ 
1 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 RALPH H. HAYCOCK, 
3 called as a witness, having first been 
4 duly sworn, was examined and testified 
5 as follows: 
6 EXAMINATION 
7 PY MRt HAYCOCK: 
8 Q Mr. Haycock, you have talked to your attorney 
9 about this deposition today? 
10 A Yes. 
11 Q Do you understand what a deposition is? 
12 A Yes. 
13 Q You have been deposed in the past? 
14 A Yes. 
15 Q You understand that I'm going to be asking you 
16 questions, and the oath you have you just took requires 
17 you to tell the truth, the whole truth. Do you 
18 understand that? 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q Is there any reason why we can't proceed with 
21 this deposition today? 
22 A No. 
23 Q Are you on any medication? 
24 A No. 
























































the trustee of the Obed C. 
1983; is that correct? 
correct. 
Haycock 
also, as I believe, the alternate trust 
Ellen Haycock of that same 
right. 
familiar with these trusts 
trust that she originally 




Q That's what I'm talking about, the trust of 
that date, of April 5, 1983. 
A That trust I am listed as an alternate, 
Q Those trusts, could you tell us what the 
distribution of these parties' assets was to be after the 
death of the survivor? 
A I would have to look it up. I don't have it on 
the tip of my tongue. I don't know that. I would have 
to look it up. 
Q To refresh your memory, do you recall that the 
trust provides that the estate of the last to die shall 
be distributed equally to Ellen Haycock's children and 
Obed Haycock's children? 
A That's correct. 
1 Q That's what it states? 
2 A That's right. 
3 Q Do you recall that, if this was the intention 
4 of your father, Obed Haycock? 
5 A Yes, that was his intention. 
6 Q Do you have any conversations with him 
7 regarding this? 
8 A Yes. 
9 Q Do you recall specific conversations? 
10 A Before his death, during the summer of 1983, I 
11 spent considerable amount of time with Obed, my father, 
12 and it was his position that his estate was set up so 
13 that when he died, certain things would go to Ellen, 
14 certain things would be divided between his children. 
15 And then when Ellen passed away, she would reciprocate 
16 and divide then the remaining—what remains after her 
17 death would be equally divided between the children, all 
18 the children, including the Haycock children and her 
19 children. 
20 Q And he expressed that that was his intention? 
21 A That was his intention, yes. 
22 Q Do you recall any occasions when Ellen was 
23 present when this subject was brought up? 
24 A In the—when we signed the will on that date— 
25 Q That date, you are referring to April— 
1 A April the 5th of 1983, he—they both expressed 
2 that that's what they wanted to do. That they both 
3 mentioned that, MYes, this is what we want to do." 
4 1 Q Do you remember specifically the words they 
5 used? 
6 A No, I don't. They expressed that as their 
7 intention. 
8 Q And who was in the meeting at that time? 
9 A Well, as I recall, I was there and Narrvel Hall 
10 was there, Obed and Ellen, and I think Bonnie was there, 
11 but I'm not sure. I can't remember, but I thought she 
12 was present also. 
13 Q Did either of them place any limitation on this 
14 intention? 
15 A No. 
16 MR. PAYNE: Objection; vague. 
17 Q (BY MR. HAYCOCK) Did either of them express 
18 any limitation on the intention that the survivor would 
19 distribute his or her estate equally to her children and 
20 his children? 
21 A By—what do you mean by conditions? 
22 Q Well, limitations. 
23 A Or limitations. I don't understand what that— 
24 Q Okay, when this intention was expressed, was it 
25 expressed before Narrvel Hall? 
1 A Yes. 
2 Q Do you remember any words that Obed may have 
3 spoken at that time? 
4 A It's been 16 years ago. All I remember is they 
5 expressed their intent to do that, both of them did. The 
6 words they used, it's been too long ago to remember the 
7 exact words. 
8 Q Did they express that this was their intent, 
9 and did either of them say, "But maybe something will 
10 happen that we won't be able to do it"? 
11 A So what—what you are saying is that, if I 
12 understand your question, is they are saying, "This is 
13 our intent; however, if the children don't behave 
14 properly, you don't have to share with them"? 
15 Q Yes, was that expressed? 
16 A No, that was not expressed. 
17 Q Was there any reference at all to the conduct 
18 of the children— 
19 A Yes. 
20 Q —toward either one of them? 
21 A Yes, there was. The issue came up, and I don't 
22 remember who mentioned it, that Dad had considered 
23 disinheriting Don Haycock. That was mentioned. Dad 
24 pondered that but said nothing, and I definitely remember 
25 that. 
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1 Q Was there anything else mentioned? 
2 A No, I can't remember anything else of that 
3 nature, no* 
4 Q Did Ellen Haycock say anything to the effect 
5 that she would disinherit Obed's children if any 
6 mistreated her? 
7 A No, that was not mentioned. 
8 Q When you came in to this meeting, did you come 
9 in with Ellen and Obed? 
10 A That's interesting. I don't remember how I got 
11 there. All I remember is I was there. I may have met 
12 them there. I may have met them. I think I did. I 
13 don't believe I rode down with them. I think I must have 
14 met them there at a certain time. 
15 Q Following this meeting, did you have any 
16 communications or conversations with Narrvel Hall 
17 regarding this intention that was expressed in this 
18 meeting? 
19 A No, not before this meeting. 
20 Q After this meeting? 
21 A After this meeting, I asked Narrvel a question 
22 that it was my understanding that part of the will, at 
23 least Dad's position was that a lot of the will was based 
24 upon Ellen's trust, and that he had written it that way 
25 where he absolutely wanted to leave—his first concern 
1 was to take care of Ellen. Dad made this very, very 
2 clear. And he—it was his feeling that Ellen would be 
3 fair and share with the children. It was his feeling 
4 that this was the best way he could do his will. And 
5 that he felt that Ellen would share her estate with all 
6 the children, just as he has done. 
7 Now, Narrvel expressed that to me, but not in 
8 exactly those words. I don't remember the words he 
9 used. But he did express that to me, that they seemed to 
10 have a mutual agreement between the two of them. 
11 Q Did Narrvel say to you, if you recall, that 
12 there was any—that Ellen was free to disinherit any 
13 children that mistreated her? 
14 A I don't recall Narrvel Hall telling me that. 
15 No, I don't recall that with Narrvel Hall, no. 
16 Q Was Bonnie Kaufman there when this discussion 
17 took place? 
18 A No, she was not there. Narrvel Hall and I were 
19 alone when that discussion took place. 
20 Q Did you have any subsequent discussions with 
21 Narrvel Hall? 
22 A I had a lot of discussions with him. 
23 Q Let me rephrase that. 
24 After Ellen disinherited Obed's children, did 
25 J you have any discussions with Narrvel Hall regarding that 
10 
1 subject? 
2 A I had none. Today is the first time I have 
3 seen Narrvel Hall since back in 1984. 
4 Q Did you have any discussions with Ellen after 
5 you learned that she had disinherited Obed's children? 
6 A No, I didn't. I don't recall discussing this 
7 with Ellen. 
8 Q Did you intend to ever have a discussion with 
9 her on this? 
10 A I had thought about it a lot, but I never did. 
11 Q Why didn't you talk to her? 
12 A Well, I wasn't sure what I would say. 
13 Q During this meeting of April 5, 1983 with 
14 Mr. Hall, was the subject of the wills and the memorandum 
15 that Don Haycock prepared— 
16 A The meeting of '83? 
17 Q The meeting where you signed these wills. Or 
18 where these trusts— 
19 A Where I signed them, was that discussed? 
20 MR. PAYNE: Just for clarification, the 
21 question was where you signed the wills, did you sign 
22 wills, those wills in 1983? 
23 THE WITNESS: The ones I signed were the 
24 revised. 
25 Q (BY MR. HAYCOCK) Restated? 
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1 A The restated wills in 1983, April the 5th# 
2 1983. 
3 MR. PAYNE: Did you sign those personally or 
4 did your father and— 
5 THE WITNESS: He signed them and I signed 
6 them. 
7 MR. DEAMER: I think you mean the restated 
8 trust agreement. 
9 THE WITNESS: The restated trust agreement, 
10 yes. 
11 Now, your question was was your documents 
12 discussed at that time? I can't remember. But I don't 
13 think they were. It doesn't stick in my mind that they 
14 were discussed at that time. 
15 Q (BY MR. HAYCOCK) Have you ever had any 
16 discussions with Bonnie Kaufman regarding the intention 
17 that the parties expressed in that meeting? 
18 A By intention, you mean to share equally? 
19 Q Yes# for this. 
20 A Yes, I have discussed that with Bonnie. 
21 Q Did Bonnie remember that discussion? 
22 A That I had with her personally? 
23 Q No, did Bonnie remember the intention that was 
24 expressed in this meeting by the parties that the 
25 survivor would share equally with the children of both? 
12 
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1 MR. PAYNE: Objection; lack of foundation. The 
2 witness has testified that he is not sure if Bonnie 
3 Kaufman was present at that meeting. 
4 THE WITNESS: I had discussed the agreement 
5 with Bonnie on several occasions, but I don't know 
6 whether we discussed it or whether I asked her whether 
7 she remembers discussing it in that particular time or 
8 not. 
9 Q (BY MR. HAYCOCK) What do you remember her 
10 saying about the agreement? 
11 A I think she felt that that was what she 
12 understood too. 
13 Q That she understood the survivor would share 
14 equally with the children of both? 
15 A Well, I think—that's precisely the way those 
16 trusts were written. They were both written that way. 
17 And I think she probably agreed with that too. I don't 
18 know that she ever took exception to that. 
19 Q Do you remember any statement she said that may 
20 have led you to believe that she didn't believe that? 
21 A I can't—right now I can't think of anything. 
22 Q You have had several conversations with Ellen 
23 after this meeting of April 5, 1983; is that true? 
24 A That's correct. 
25 Q Has Ellen ever brought the subject up? 
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1 A The only thing Ellen has ever mentioned to me, 
2 that she felt that Dad should have disinherited you, 
3 That's the only thing she's ever mentioned. She was 
4 very—she felt that Dad was put under an incredible 
5 amount of stress. That's the only thing she said. 
6 Q She has not stated that this intention, that 
7 the survivor shall make the distribution to both their 
8 children equally, she never said anything about that that 
9 you recall? 
10 A I can't recall. I always assumed that that's 
11 what she was going to do. I assumed that was their 
12 intention. 
13 Q Were you in attendance at a meeting on 
14 Valentine's Day, 1979, it would have been February 14th, 
15 1979, where Obed and Ellen were present and the estates 
16 were discussed? 
17 A Valentine's Day, 1979? I can't isolate that 
18 date. These documents were discussed on numerous 
19 occasions, and I can't—it's been too long ago to isolate 
20 that particular date. 
21 Q No, what I'm referring to is a meeting that 
22 took place before these documents of April 5, 1983, and 
23 the documents of June 28, 1979 were prepared. 
24 A I can't remember any specific meeting on that 
25 time frame. 
14 
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Q When you had your discussions with Narrvel Hall 
following this April 5, 1983 meeting, did he indicate to 
you that he believed Ellen would honor this agreement? 
MR, PAYNE: Objection to characterization of it 
as an agreement. 
THE WITNESS: No, I don't think—I don't think 
he mentioned that. I think he mentioned that it was her 
intention and Dad's intentions to do this. I don't think 
he made a judgment as to whether that would happen or 
not. I can't remember him saying that. 
Q (BY MR. HAYCOCK) From Ellen's expression to 
you that Obed should have disinherited Don Haycock, did 
you get the impression that she was going to live up to 
the agreement or the intention? 
A Yeah, I thought she would. I think she was 
very disturbed that she—I think she loved Dad, and I 
think this was a difficult thing for her. I think she 
saw him go through a lot of pain. And I think she was 
just expressing her feelings. 
Q Why do you think she didn't live up to that 
intention? 
A I don't know. 
Q Do you believe that Bonnie Kaufman had anything 
to do with that? 
A Well, I'm sure that Bonnie maybe played some 
15 
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1 role in it, but I don't know what role. I don't know. 
2 Maybe the Haycock children didn't visit her enough. 
3 Maybe we weren't—we didn't try hard enough to get close 
4 to her. I don't know what the reasons were, Don. 
5 Q Okay. Then in one of your letters you 
6 mentioned that Obed and Ellen had entered into a 
7 covenant? 
8 A I don't remember that letter. I don't remember 
9 that letter. You will have to show it to me. 
10 Q I have the letter. Unfortunately, I didn't 
11 bring it, but I can produce it. 
12 My question is do you recall what you were 
13 referring to? I will represent that that is what was 
14 stated in the letter as to what covenant they were 
15 talking about. 
16 MR. PAYNE: Objection; foundation. 
17 MR. DEAMER: I join in that objection. 
18 THE WITNESS: The only thing I remember is that 
19 they entered into an agreement. Whether you would call 
20 that a covenant or not, I don't—I would call it more of 
21 an agreement they had with each other to share equally in 
22 their estates. 
23 Q (BY MR. HAYCOCK) On another subject, you were 
24 to produce certain documents at this deposition. Did you 
25 bring them? 
16 
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1 same method of conforming that appeared on the 
2 prior document. 
3 Q All right. I111 hand you what's been 
4 marked as Exhibit No. 5 and ask if you can identify 
5 that document for us. 
6 A Yes, This appears to be the amended 
7 and restated trust document, at least a copy of the 
8 amended and restated trust document, executed by 
9 Ellen S. Haycock on April 5, 1983. And again, it 
10 appears to be a copy made from our conformed file 
11 copy of that document. 
12 Q All right. Let me hand you what's been 
13 marked as Exhibit No. 6. Do you recognize that 
14 document? 
15 A I do. That appears to be a copy of our 
16 conformed file copy of the will executed by Ellen 
17 S. Haycock on April 5th of 1983. 
18 Q All right. Let me hand you now what's 
19 been marked as Exhibit 7. Do you recognize that 
20 document? 
2 1 A I do. This appears to be a copy of a 
22 letter which I wrote to Ralph H. Haycock on 
23 February 9, 1984. 
24 Q Okay. Ifll represent to you that this 
25 is a copy of that letter that I received from 
SUSETTE M. SNIDER 
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CAPITOL REPORTERS 
AMENDED AND RESTATED 
Ellen S. Haycockr a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah, hereinafter referred to as "Trustor", and Ralph Hugh Haycock 
and Bonnie Lou L. Kaufman, hereinafter referred to as "Trustee", 
hereby enter into this Amended and Restated Trust Agreement 
this J£L d a v o f f?tr»s,\Jl , 1983, amending in its entirety that 
certain Trust Agreement between Trustor and Ralph Hugh Haycock, as 
Trustee dated the 28th day of June, 1979, for the benefit of 
Trustor for life and then for the benefit of Trustor's "Children" 
and "Descendants", as defined in Sections 6.1 and 6.2 below. 
I. CREATION OF TRUST - PROPERTIES 
$1.1 Transfer of Property to Trust. Trustor hereby creates 
this trust and transfers to Trustee the sum of twenty-five dollars 
($25.00) to be administered by Trustee pursuant to the provisions 
hereof. 
$1.2 Additional Transfers to Trust. Trustor or any other 
person may make additional contributions of cash or property to 
this trust by inter vivos transfer or by will and such 
contributions shall be held and administered by Trustee pursuant 
to the provisions hereof. 
$1.3 Insurance. Trustor may cause Trustee to be named 
beneficiary of policies of insurance on the life of Trustor. All 
proceeds from insurance received by Trustee shall be administered 
by Trustee in accordance with the provisions hereof. 
II. PROVISIONS APPLICABLE DURING TRUSTOR'S LIFE 
$2.1 Trustor Directs Distributions. During Trustor's life, 
Trustee shall distribute to Trustor such part or all of the 
income, retained income and principal of the trust estate as 
Trustor directs in writing. All income not distributed pursuant 
to such directions of Trustor shall be reinvested by Trustee. 
$2.2 Trustor May Alter, Amend or Revoke. Trustor shall have 
the right from time to time during Trustor's life, by a document 
in writing delivered to Trustee, to alter, amend or revoke this 
trust either in whole or in part. Nevertheless, the interests of 
all beneficiaries shall vest at date hereof and shall remain 
vested until such time as Trustor alters, amends or revokes such 
interests in such manner. Upon any revocation Trustee shall 
distribute the trust estate pursuant to the written directions of 
Trustor. Neither Trustor nor any person on behalf of Trustor may 
alter, amend or revoke this trust in whole or in part, after 
Trustor's death, or during any incompetency of Trustor. 
$2.3 Benefits in Event of Incapacity. During any period with 
respect to which Trustor is determined to be unable to manage 
properly Trustor's own affairs, Trustee shall have discretion to 
the income and principal as Trustee determines is reasonably 
necessary or appropriate for Trustor's support, maintenance or 
benefit, and/or for the support, education or maintenance of any 
person to the extent dependent upon Trustor. 
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§2.4 Trustor Directs Investments. So long as Trustor lives 
and has capacity to do so, Trustor shall have the right to direct 
the investment of the trust estate by a written instrument 
delivered to Trustee. Trustee shall sell such properties which 
are part of the trust estate as directed by Trustor and shall 
reinvest the proceeds in such properties as directed by Trustor. 
Trustee shall not be liable for any loss or losses sustained by 
compliance with any direction of Trustor or through the retention 
of any investment directed by Trustor. So long as Trustor lives 
and has capacity to do so, Trustor shall have the right to vote 
any voting stock which is part of the trust estate, and upon 
written request of Trustor, Trustee shall deliver to Trustor 
appropriate proxies for the voting of any such stock or shall vote 
such stock as directed by Trustor. Trustee shall not be 
responsible or liable for any loss or losses sustained through the 
voting of such stock by Trustor or as directed by Trustor. 
§2.5 Administration of Insurance Policies. Trustor reserves 
the right by Trustor's own act alone, without the consent or 
approval of Trustee, to sell, assign, or hypothecate any policies 
of insurance upon Trustor's life of which Trustor is the owner 
made payable to Trustee, to exercise any option or privilege 
granted by such policies, including, but without limitation of the 
generality of the foregoing, the right to change the beneficiaries 
of such policies, to borrow any sum in accordance with the 
provisions of such policies, to use such policies as collateral, 
and to receive all payments, dividends, surrender values, benefits 
or privileges of any kind which may accrue on account of such 
policies during Trustor's lifetime. Trustee shall when requested, 
without incurring any liability on its part, approve any such 
sale, assignment or hypothecation. Trustee shall not be required 
to pay premiums or other charges upon any policy of insurance on 
the life of Trustor of which Trustee is the beneficiary and shall 
hold such policies of insurance as may be delivered to Trustee 
subject to Trustor's order without obligation during Trustor's 
life other than the safekeeping of such policies. 
§2.6 Determination of Competency by Court. For all purposes 
of this trust, Trustor shall be deemed competent unless declared 
to be legally incompetent under the laws of the State of Utah. 
III. ADMINISTRATION FOLLOWING TRUSTOR'S DEATH 
§3.1 Payment of Debts, Taxes and Expenses Following Trustor's 
Death. Following Trustor's death, Trustee may, in Trustee's 
discretion, utilize trust properties to discharge part or all of 
Trustor's due but unpaid debts, expenses of Trustor's last 
illness, burial and the administration of Trustor's estate and any 
estate, inheritance or other death taxes arising at or because of 
Trustor's death, together with interest and penalties thereon, if 
any. Trustee shall consult with Trustor's Personal Representative 
in determining the source from which such debts, expenses, taxes, 
interest and penalties, if any, shall be paid, using assets of 
Trustor's estate or properties of the trust, or both, to the 
extent appropriate. 
53.2 Purchase of AsseLa from Estate, ix>an to Estate. Trustee 
shall have discretion to purchase assets from Trustor's estate at 
their fair market value as determined by Trustee and the Personal 
Representative of Trustor's estate and/or to advance funds with or 
without interest and with or without security to the Personal 
Representative of Trustor's estate to enable the Personal 
Representative of Trustor's estate to pay such debts, expenses 
and taxes. 
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§3.3 Use of "Flower Bonds" to Pay Tax. In the event at the 
time of Trustor's death the trust estate includes any U. S. 
Treasury bonds trading at less than par value and which may be 
redeemed at par value plus accrued interest in payment of federal 
estate taxes, to the extent of the federal estate tax arising by 
reason of Trustor's death, Trustee shall deliver such bonds to the 
Personal Representative of Trustor's estate and the trust shall 
terminate with respect to such bonds or Trustee shall redeem such 
bonds in payment of the federal estate tax, and if such bonds are 
insufficient to pay such tax in full and if necessary for the 
redemption of such bonds at par, Trustee shall pay from the trust 
estate the remaining federal estate tax. As used herein, federal 
estate tax includes interest and penalties thereon, if any. 
§3.4 Exercise of Discretionary Powers by Trustee. Except 
with respect to the payment of the federal estate tax by the 
redemption of bonds as above provided, nothing herein contained 
shall subject any properties of the trust estate to any claims 
against or liabilities of Trustor or the estate of Trustor to 
which such properties would not otherwise be subject, and Trustee 
shall not use, in paying any death taxes, properties of the trust 
estate which are not includable in Trustor's gross estate for such 
death tax purposes. Trustee may exercise its discretion hereunder 
in the best interests of both the beneficiaries under Trustor's 
will and of the trusts created under this Trust Agreement, and it 
is Trustor's intention that Trustee will exercise its discretion 
so that any specific gifts in the will of Trustor may be satisfied 
in full. 
53.5 Payments to be Made Within Five Years. All payments 
pursuant to the provisions of Section 3.1 above other than 
deferred and/or installment payments of estate and/or inheritance 
taxes, shall be made not later than five (5) years after Trustor's 
death; provided, however, that any obligation to make deferred 
and/or installment payments of estate or inheritance taxes may be 
assumed by Trustee of the Family Trust created under Article IV 
below, and the gift provided in Article IV may be funded prior to 
full payment of such estate and/or inheritance taxes. 
53.6 Household and Personal Effects. Trustor intends to 
leave at Trustor's death one or more written documents executed 
pursuant to the provisions of U.C.A. section 75-2-513 (Utah 
Uniform Probate Code) providing for disposition of part or all of 
Trustor's tangible personal and household effects. Any such 
written document shall be deemed an amendment to this Trust 
Agreement to the extent it purports to dispose of any such 
tangible personal or household effects which have been transferred 
to Trustee. Therefore, in the event Trustee receives any of 
Trustor's or Trustor's Spouse's household and/or personal effects, 
including silverware, chine, linens, furniture, furnishings and 
supplies, rugs, books, paintings, pictures, musical instruments, 
or similar articles of domestic use or adornment, or personal 
jewelry, clothing and sporting equipment, Trustee shall distribute 
said items of tangible personal and household effects in 
accordance with the provisions of said written document or 
documents. In the event Trustor's Spouse Survives Trustor. 
Trustee shall distribute t? Trustor'*> Spouse all of the household 
and personal effects held or received by Trustee which have not 
been otherwise diposed of by such written document or documents. 
If Trustor's Spouse does not Survive Trustor, however, Trustee 
shall have absolute discretion to distribute said household and 
personal effects in equal shares (or as nearly equal shares as 
Trustee deems practicable) to Trustor's Children who are then 
living, or to sell or to retain such items, and, if retained, 
Trustee shall have no investment responsibility with respect to 
such items. If retained, Trustee shall have discretion to allow 
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Trustor's Children the use and possession of such items without 
responsibility for their safekeeping and to distribute such items 
outright to Trustor's Children for the use and benefit of any or 
all of Trustor's Children, prior to the termination of the trust, 
in such manner, shares and at such times as Trustee deems 
appropriate. 
S3.7 Legacies. Trustee shall, as soon as practicable after 
Trustor's death, distribute out of the residue of the trust estate 
remaining after the payments provided for in Section 3.1 above, 
the following gifts to the following persons: 
(a) Automobiles. To Trustor's Spouse, if Trustor's 
Spouse Survives Trustor, any automobiles or other motor 
vehicles or any interest therein that Trustor may dispose of 
by this Trust Agreement, together with all insurance policies 
relating thereto. 
(b) Club Memberships. To Trustor's Spouse, if Trustor's 
Spouse Survives Trustor, any social or athletic club 
memberships, certificates or other interests in such clubs 
that Trustor owns at Trustor's death and may dispose of by 
this Trust Agreement. 
IV. FAMILY SHARE - GIFT IN TRUST 
S'4.1 Creation of Family Trust. Upon Trustor's death, whether 
or not Trustor's Spouse Survives Trustor, all of the rest and 
residue of the trust estate, after the payments and distributions 
provided for in Article III above, shall constitute the Family 
Trust, and Trustee shall hold, manage, invest and reinvest the 
trust estate and shall collect the income therefrom and shall 
dispose of the net income, accumulated income and principal 
subject to and in accordance with Sections 4.2 through 4.7 below. 
The trust created under this Article IV shall be known as the 
Family Trust. 
S4.2 Income to Trustor's Spouse. For so long as Trustor's 
Spouse lives, Trustee shall pay to or apply for the benefit of 
Trustor's Spouse the net income from the trust estate in monthly 
or other convenient installments, not less frequently than 
annually. 
§4.3 Discretionary Invasion of Principal for Spouse. For so 
long as Trustor's Spouse lives, after having considered other 
funds available for Trustor's Spouse, Trustee shall have 
discretion to retain or to distribute to or apply for the benefit 
of Trustor's Spouse, in addition to such income benefits, so much 
or all of the principal of the trust estate as Trustee determines 
is needed to support Trustor's Spouse in Trustor's Spouse's 
accustomed manner of living and as is needed for the maintenance 
of health, including medical, dental, hospital and nursing 
expenses and expenses of invalidism. In exercising discretion to 
make such distributions, Trustee may consider other property and 
sources of income available to Trustor's Spouse. 
54.4 Qccupanry of Rocinon^a a^y .^r.terect in reel property 
and improvements used by Trustor as a personal residence which is 
held or received by Trustee shall be administered for the benefit 
of Trustor's Spouse as long as Trustor's Spouse lives. In the 
event Trustor's Spouse Survives Trustor and for so long as 
Trustor's Spouse lives, Trustee shall have discretion to retain 
such interest in real property and improvements for so long as 
Trustor's Spouse desires, and is able, to occupy said real 
property and improvements as a residence and, while so retained, 
Trustee shall not be required to sell said real property and 
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impovements for the purpose of investing the proceeds thereof and 
shall not be under any liability or obligation by reason of any 
loss of, damage to, or depreciation in value of said real property 
and improvements. With respect to such real property and 
improvements as are retained, Trustee shall have discretion to 
allow Trustor's Spouse, for so long as Trustor's Spouse lives, the 
use and possession of such real property and improvements without 
any responsibility to charge or collect any amounts as rent for 
the use and possession of the premises so long as such use and 
possession represents net income of the trust estate or is needed 
to support Trustor's Spouse in such Spouse's accustomed manner of 
living. 
§4.5 Creation of Separate Shares and Distribution. Upon the 
death of the Survivor of Trustor and Trustor's Spouse, Trustee 
shall divide the remaining trust estate into as many equal shares 
as the sum of (i) the number of Trustor's then living Children and 
(ii) the number of Trustor's deceased Children who have then 
living Descendants. Trustee shall thereupon transfer and 
distribute one such equal share to each of Trustor's then living 
Children. Trustee shall administer one such equal share not so 
distributed for the benefit of the living Descendants of each 
deceased Child of Trustor in accordance with the provisions of 
Section 4.6 hereof. 
§4.6 Continuing Trust for Descendants of Deceased Children. 
After the creation of such separate shares, Trustee shall 
administer as a separate trust a share for the benefit of the 
living Descendants of each deceased Child of Trustor in accordance 
with the following provisions, which shall apply to each such 
trust: 
(a> Benefits. For the duration of the trust, Trustee 
shall have discretion to distribute to, or to apply for the 
benefit of, the living Descendants of such deceased Child of 
Trustor such part or all of the net income, accumulated income 
and principal of the trust estate in such amounts, manner and 
proportions as Trustee deems appropriate, after having 
considered other income and properties of each person of such 
class, to support, maintain and educate each of the living 
Descendants of such deceased Child of Trustor. 
(b) Distribution. The trust shall terminate when all of 
the living Children of such deceased Child of Trustor have 
attained the age of twenty-one (21) years or sooner died, and 
Trustee shall thereupon distribute the trust estate in equal 
shares by right of representation to the living Descendants of 
such deceased Child of Trustor. In the event all of the 
Descendants of a deceased Child of Trustor die prior to 
distribution, such trust shall thereupon terminate and Trustee 
shall distribute the trust estate in equal shares by right of 
representation to Trustor's then living Descendants with the 
Trustee of each of the other separate trusts herein created 
for the benefit of Descendants of a deceased Child of Trustor 
receiving the share of such deceased Child. 
54* *? Contingent Remainder. In the f»venf th#»ro *r«» no b'winn 
Descendants of Trustor upon the termination of any trust, Trustee 
shall divide the trust estate into two equal shares and shall 
distribute one such equal share to the then living heirs of 
Trustor and the other equal share to the then living heirs of 
Trustor's Spouse. Such heirs shall be determined at the time of 
distribution under the laws of the State of Utah then in effect. 
23 
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V. TRUSTEE 
S5.1 Powers of Trustee. Trustee, as a fiduciary, in the 
administration of all trusts created by this Trust Agreement, 
shall, except as otherwise limited in Article II above or in 
Section 5.8 below, have all powers conferred upon trustees by law, 
includingf but not by way of limitation, those powers enumerated 
in Part 4, Chapter 7 of Title 75 (the Utah Uniform Probate Code) 
U.C.A., and in addition Trustee, as fiduciaryf acting reasonably 
and for the benefit of the interested persons, shall have the 
following additional specific powers: 
(a) Retain Assets. Trustee shall have power to retain 
indefinitely assets received by Trustee from Trustor during 
life or as part of, or from, Trustor's estater so long as in 
Trustee's judgment it is advisable to do so. 
(b) Carry on Trade or Business. Trustee shall have 
power to carry on in the same form, to continue to hold 
indefinitely and to expand, any trade, business or other 
enterprise, whether or not incorporated, which was carried on 
by Trustor in Trustor's lifetime, so long as in Trustee's 
judgment it is advisable to do so. 
(i) to invest additional sums in any such business, 
incorporated or unincorporated, even to the extent that 
any trust hereby created may be invested largely or 
entirely in any such business; 
(ii) to act as or to select other persons 
^{including any beneficiary hereunder) to act as 
directors, officers or other employees of any such 
business, the same to be compensated without regard to 
their being a fiduciary or beneficiary hereunder? and 
(iii) to make such other arrangements in respect 
thereof as Trustee shall deem proper. Trustee shall be 
entitled to reasonable compensation, in addition to the 
regular fee allowed by statute, rule of court or local 
custom for Trustee services rendered, for services 
performed in the management and operation of any such 
business. 
(c) Retain Partnership Interests. Trustee shall have 
power to retain and to hold indefinitely any interest in any 
partnership in which Trustor was a partner, so long as in 
Trustee's judgment it is advisable to do so. 
(d) Conversion of Assets to Limited Partnership 
Interests. Trustee shall have power to convert any property 
or business interest held by Trustee into a limited partner's 
interest in a limited partnership, if in Trustee's judgment it 
is advisable to do so. 
(G) Releases. Trustee shall have power to execute and 
deliver full or partial releases, by deed or otherwise, with 
re«?norf to any conditional t»al« turaract, mortgage, deed of 
trust, or security agreement, on real or personal property 
sold or held as security by Trustor or by Trustee, in exchange 
for full or part cash payment of sums remaining due, or for 
the purchaser's or debtor's note for the sum remaining due 
secured by security which in Trustee's judgment is adequate. 
(f) Borrowing. Trustee may borrow money for, or lend 
money at a reasonable rate of interest to, any trust created 
herein, to be secured by the assets of the trust as against 
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the beneficiaries, whenever in Trustee's judgment such a loan 
would protect such trust or would otherwise be in the best 
interests of the beneficiaries thereof. 
(g) Prudent Man Standard. Trustee may invest and 
reinvest funds and other assets in such properties as men of 
prudence, discretion and intelligence purchase for their own 
accounts, having regard not to speculation, but to the 
permanent disposition of their funds and considering the 
probable income as well as the probable safety of their 
capital, including but not by way of limitation, common trust 
funds, .shares and obligations of Trustee and shares and 
obligations of any affiliate, whether or not of the character 
otherwise permitted by law for the investment of funds of a 
fiduciary. 
(h) Direct Distribution to Beneficiary of a Trust 
Without Funding Trust. In the event all conditions precedent 
to final distribution of any trust created herein have been 
satisfied prior to completion of administration of Trustor's 
estate and/or the payments and distributions provided for in 
Article III above, Trustee may distribute all of the assets, 
which would otherwise have been distributed through such 
trust, directly to the remainder beneficiary or beneficiaries 
without funding the trust. 
(i) Distributions Based on Current Values-
Consideration of BasiFI Trustee shall have full power and 
discretion in making distribution of the corpus of any trust 
estate for which such Trustee is responsible to allocate 
assets, in cash or in kind, among the distributees, based upon 
values on the date or dates of distribution, except to the 
extent that any such allocation may conflict with other 
specific provisions or directions contained in this Trust 
Agreement. Trustee shall have the power to cause any share to 
be composed of cash, property and/or an undivided fractional 
interest in property, which undivided fractional interest in 
property may be different in kind from any undivided 
fractional interest in property distributed as part of any 
other share. In making such allocations, Trustee is 
authorized, but shall not be required, to take into account 
the basis for gain or loss which each asset will carry in the 
hands of the distributee and the circumstances of the 
distributee with respect to the tax consequences of holding 
and disposing of the asset to the extent such circumstances 
are known to, or anticipated by, Trustee. 
(j) Administration Outside Utah. The statutory powers 
referred to in this Section are incorporated herein by 
reference. In the event Trustee shall administer all or a 
portion of any trust created hereunder in a jurisdiction other 
than the State of Utah, Trustee, successor Trustee or 
Co-Trustees shall have, with respect to all or any portion of 
the trust estate, all of the powers of a trustee referred to 
in this Section, including those so incorporated by reference. 
55.2 Exculpatory Provisions. The liabilities of Trust-pp 
which might arise out of administration of the provisions of this 
Trust Agreement shall be limited as follows: 
(a) Relating to Acts of Predecessor Trustees. No 
successor Trustee shall be liable or responsible in any way 
for any damage or loss to the trust estate resulting from, or 
occasioned by, anything done or neglected to be done by any 
predecessor Trustee, nor shall a successor Trustee be 
obligated to obtain an accounting from, or on behalf of, any 
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predecessor Trustee, but such successor Trustee shall be 
liable only for his acts and conduct, not the failure to act 
or omissions, of a predecessor Trustee and shall incur no 
liability for receiving in trust property transferred to him, 
her or it as Co-Trustee or successor Trustee of his, her or 
its own acts and defaults in respect to property actually 
received by him, her or it as such Trustee. 
(b) Relating to Life Insurance Proceeds. Upon the death 
of Trustor or upon the maturity of any policy maturing prior 
to the death of Trustor, in the event Trustee is named 
recipient of the proceeds and upon receiving possession of the 
policy or policies, Trustee shall use reasonable efforts to 
collect all sums payable on such policies, which sums upon 
receipt shall become part of the trust estate. Trustee may 
compromise, arbitrate or otherwise adjust claims upon any of 
the policies. The receipt of Trustee to the insurer shall be 
a full and complete release and discharge of the insurer, and 
the insurer is not required to see to the application of the 
proceeds of any policy of insurance. Trustee shall not be 
responsible for any acts or omissions of Trustor in connection 
with or relating to any policy and shall not be required to 
prosecute any action to collect any insurance or to defend any 
action relating to any policy of insurance unless indemnified 
against costs and expenses, including attorneys' fees. 
(c) Relating to Reliance on Documents. Any Co-Trustee 
or designated, named or appointed successor Trustee, without 
any liability or requirement of investigation, may rely upon 
the document designating, naming or appointing it as such if 
it is attached to any executed copy of this Trust Agreement 
and if such fiduciary does not have actual possession of a 
subsequent, contrary or conflicting document. Any Trustee, 
without any liability or requirement of investigation, may 
rely upon the terms of and provisions for distribution of the 
trusts under this Trust Agreement based solely on the executed 
documents in its actual possession. Any Trustee hereunder 
ceasing to act as such shall deliver all executed copies of 
this Trust Agreement and amendments and designations incident 
thereto in its possession to the successor Trustee. 
(d) Relating to Powers Retained by Trustor. For so long 
as Trustor lives. Trustee shall comply with all written 
directions made by Trustor with respect to the retention, 
sale, exchange or other acquisition, disposition, investment 
or reinvestment of any property held by Trustee. Trustee 
shall be immune from all liability by reason of complying with 
such written directions of Trustor. 
§5.3 Succession. The following provisions shall govern 
succession to the Trusteeship: 
(a) Successor Trustee. Upon the death, resignation or 
inability of Bonnie Lou L. Kaufman to serve as Co-Trustee, 
Derek Kaufman shall serve as Co-Trustee in her stead. Upon 
the death, resignation or inability of Ralph Hugh Haycock to 
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Co-Trustee in his stead. 
(b) Resignation. Any Trustee acting hereunder may 
resign at any time by delivery of a written notice and final 
accounting to Trustor, if alive and competent, but if Trustor 
is not alive and competent, to successor Trustee named herein, 
if any, and to any adult beneficiaries. In the event of the 
resignation, refusal or inability to act of the last successor 
Trustee acting or appointed to act hereunder, Trustor, if 
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alive and competent, otherwise such adult beneficiaries, 
acting unanimously, as the case may be, may appoint a 
successor Trustee to administer the trust estate. 
§5.4 Waiver of Bond. No Trustee or successor Trustee 
hereunder shall be required to give any bond or other security for 
the faithful performance of its duties, powers and discretions. 
§5.5 Compensation. Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable 
compensation for services rendered. 
$5.6 Delegation. Any individual Co-Trustee acting hereunder 
may, by an instrument signed, acknowledged and delivered to the 
other Co-Trustee, delegate any rights or powers to the other 
Co-Trustee, and, after such delegation, shall have no further 
responsibility with respect to the exercise of such rights or 
powers so long as such delegation shall remain in effect. Any 
such delegation may be revoked by a similar instrument so 
delivered at any time. 
§5.7 Income and Principal. Except as otherwise specifically 
provided herein, Trustee shall determine what is allocable to 
principal and what is allocable to income of a trust in accordance 
with the provisions of the Utah Revised Uniform Principal and 
Income Act, sections 22-3-1 ejb seq, U.C.A. 
(a) Securities Purchased at a Premium. Trustee shall 
have full discretion to amortize in whole or in part, by 
sinking fund or otherwise, the premium on securities received 
or purchased at a premium, or to treat as income the gross 
return thereon. Without limiting Trustee's absolute 
discretion, it is Trustor's desire that such premiums be 
amortized only when Trustee shall determine that the failure 
to amortize would result in a substantial impairment of 
principal. 
(b) Matters Not Covered by Statute. Trustee shall have 
full discretion to determine what is allocable to principal 
and what is allocable to income with respect to matters not 
provided for either by the Utah Revised Uniform Principal and 
Income Act or by specific provision of this Trust Agreement. 
(c) Fees and Administrative Expenses. Trustee shall 
have full discretion to allocate fees and administrative 
expenses to income, or to principal, or part to each. 
§5.8 Limitations on Powers of Trustee. Any provision of law 
or of this Trust Agreement to the contrary notwithstanding, the 
powers of Trustee, otherwise granted by law or by this Trust 
Agreement, shall be limited or restricted as follows: 
(a) Stock of "Controlled" Corporation. If at Trustor's 
death Trustor owns any stock of a "controlled corporation" 
within the meaning of I.R.C. section 2036 which was received 
by Trustor by gift from Trustor's Spouse, and if Trustor's 
Spouse Survives Trustor and serves as a fiduciary or 
co-fiduciary hereunder, all power to vote such stock which is, 
oi might be construed as, a retainea voting right within the 
meaning of said provision of the Code shall be vested solely 
in the other co-fiduciary, if any, or if there is none, then 
in the person or persons named as successor fiduciary 
hereunder, or who may be appointed pursuant to law, as a 
special fiduciary for the purpose of exercising such power. 
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(b) Other Limitations Found in Trust Agreement. Trustee 
shall abide by the limits placed on Trustee's power in Article 
V above, as well as those found elsewhere in this Trust 
Agreement. 
VI. DEFINITIONS AND RULES FOR CONSTRUCTION 
56.1 Spouse. Trustor is presently married to the Spouse 
identified on the Schedule of Family Members attached hereto and 
by reference made a part hereof. References herein to Trustor's 
"Spouse" shall be deemed to refer to said Spouse during Trustor's 
lifetime while said Spouse lives so long as Trustor is not 
divorced or legally separated from said Spouse. In the event said 
Spouse predeceases Trustor, or if Trustor and said Spouse are 
divorced or legally separated at Trustor's death, for all purposes 
of the provisions of this Trust Agreement which take effect at or 
after Trustor's death, said Spouse shall not be deemed to be 
Trustor's Surviving Spouse. In the event Trustor remarries 
following the death of, or Trustor's divorce from, Trustor's 
present Spouse, all references herein to Trustor's Spouse shall be 
deemed to apply to such subsequent Spouse subject to the same 
conditions as are provided above with respect to determination of 
the status of Trustor's present Spouse. 
§6.2 Child and Descendant. Trustor's present living Child as 
well as Trustor's Spouse's present living Children are identified 
on the Schedule of Family Members attached hereto and by this 
reference made a part hereof. Whenever used herein, the terms 
"Child" and "Children" refer, not only to all of Trustor's 
children, but also to Trustor's Spouse's children, and the terms 
"issue" and "Descendants" include descendants of Trustor's 
Spouse's children, adopted Children of any generation and 
Descendants of adopted Children of any generation as well as 
natural Children and natural Descendants. Trustor desires and 
intends to treat Trustor's Spouse's children and their descendants 
in all respects the same as Trustor's own child and her 
descendants. 
Any Descendant of Trustor (natural or adopted, living or 
deceased) who is subsequently adopted by any other person shall 
continue to be deemed for all purposes (including the rights of 
his or her Descendants) as a Descendant of Trustor and not as a 
Descendant of the subsequently adopting parent. 
§6.3 Gender. For all purposes of this Trust Agreement, where 
applicable, the masculine includes the feminine and the neuter, 
and vice versa. 
§6.4 Singular or Plural. For all purposes of this Trust 
Agreement, where applicable, the singular includes the plural, and 
vice versa. 
§6.5 Survivorship. For all purposes of this Trust Agreement, 
the word "Survive" in its various forms shall be defined, 
construed and interpreted in accordance with the following 
presumptions: 
la) Survivorship ot Trustor. In the event Trustor's 
Spouse and Trustor die under circumstances whereby there is no 
sufficient evidence that they died otherwise than 
simultaneously, it shall be presumed that Trustor "Survived" 
Trustor's Spouse and all properties of this trust shall be 
administered as though Trustor Survived Trustor's Spouse. 
(b) Survivorship of Others. In the event any other 
beneficiary of any trust created by this Trust Agreement shall 
die prior to the expiration of a period of thirty (30) days 
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from the date of the event entitling such beneficiary to 
benefits, then for the purposes of such trust it shall be 
deemed that such beneficiary did not "Survive" such event, and 
the trust properties shall be administered and distributed as 
though such beneficiary had predeceased such event? provided, 
however, that this provision shall not be applied to a 
termination of a trust pursuant to Section 7.2 hereof. 
(c) Predeceased, Each beneficiary who, under 
subsections (a) or (b) above, is presumed not to have Survived 
Trustor and/or an event entitling said beneficiary to 
benefits, shall accordingly be deemed to have, respectively, 
"Predeceased" Trustor and/or such event. 
§6.6 Effect of Spendthrift Clause on Powers of Appointment. 
The provisions of Section 7.1 below shall not be construed to 
prevent or prohibit any beneficiary from exercising any powers of 
appointment granted to such beneficiary by the provisions of any 
trust created by this Trust Agreement. 
§6.7 Situs. This trust has been created in the State of Utah 
and its validity, construction and all rights, duties, privileges, 
powers and immunities created by it shall be governed by the laws 
of the State of Utah. 
56.8 Severability. If any provision of this instrument is 
unenforceable, the remaining provisions, nevertheless, shall be 
carried into effect. 
$6«9 Headings. Headings are provided herein for Articles, 
Sections and subsections primarily for convenience of reference. 
However,^said headings are a part of the text of this Trust 
Agreement and may be utilized as an aid to interpretation where 
the context permits. In the event, however, that there is a 
conflict or inconsistency between a heading and the text material 
organized under that heading, the latter shall control. It is not 
intended that all headings be comprehensively descriptive of text 
materials organized under said headings. 
§6.10 U.C.A. References herein to "U.C.A." refer to Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953, and all references to specific sections 
thereof refer to the sections cited, as they presently exist, as 
well as to future amended or successor provisions dealing with the 
same subject matter. 
VII. MISCELLANEOUS 
57.1 Benefits are Insulated. No beneficiary of any of the 
trusts created by this Trust Agreement shall have power to pledge, 
mortgage, encumber, anticipate, assign, sell or in any manner 
transfer or hypothecate any interest which said beneficiary may 
have or may expect to have in any property distributable to such 
beneficiary, whether income or principal, and whether such 
distribution is vested, discretionary or contingent; and such 
interest of any beneficiary shall not be liable or subject in any 
manner to or for the debts, contracts, liabilities, engagements, 
obligations or torts of such beneficiary, in favor of any person 
or entity, including creditors, betrotheds, Spouses and 
ex-Spouses, while said property is in the possession of Trustee. 
57.2 Perpetuities Period Limits Term of Trusts. 
Notwithstanding anything herein contained to the contrary, no 
trust created by this Trust Agreement shall continue for more than 
twenty-one (21) years after the death of the last Survivor of the 
class consisting of Trustor, Trustor's Spouse and Trustor's 
Descendants who are living at the date of this Trust Agreement. 
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If any trust created by this Trust Agreement shall not have 
terminated at, or prior to the expiration of, such period, Trustee 
shall, at the expiration of such period, distribute all of the 
trust properties as provided in such trust as though the time for 
distribution had occurred, and the trust shall thereupon terminate. 
EXECUTED the date first above written. 
Trustor, Ellen S. Haycock 
Trustee, Ralph Hugh Haycock 
ss. 
STATE OF UTAH 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
On the 
appeared before me, Ellen S. Hancock, known by me to be the signer 
of the foregoing document, who duly acknowledged to me that she 
executed the same. 
) 
day of G 1983, personally 
My Commission Expires: 
S( CrsWrtOL. V X-^>o- C 
\% MS 
Notary Public^ ~ 
Residing at V^^XKAJOLSJO , Utah 
KAY. OUINNCV * NKBCKKR 
AOO DKSEKET »UII_DINa 
•AL.T LAKE CITY. UTAH 
30 HOI 22 
LAW OFFICES OF 
DON II I IAYCOCK& ASSOCIATES 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORA I ION 
7321 WI-Sll.AWN AVFNUF. 
LOS ANCiKIJ'S.CA 90045 
Tel: 310/641-3921 
Fax: 310/641-6638 
June 7, 2000 
UTAH STATE BAR 
Office of Professional Conduct 
645 South 200 East, Suite 310 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 - 3834 
lie: Professional Misconduct of the Law Firm ofRA ) \ QVINNEY & NEBEKER 
and its Attorney Narrvel E. Hall 
Dear Sits/Madams: 
The Law Firm of RAY, QUINNEY & NEF3EKER and its attorney Narrvel E. 
Hall are charged with violation of the following Rules of Professional Conduct in its 
administration of the Estale of Obed C. Haycock: 
(a) Rule L4 Communications. 
While retained as attorney for the Obed. C. Haycock Estate, Attorney Narrvel 
Hall failed to inform its personal representative of secret communications he had with the second 
wife of Obed Haycock, Ellen Haycock, and her daughter Bonnie Kaufman, in which they 
requested he take actions on their behalf that were both adverse to rights of the other heirs and 
violated Obed Haycock's testamentary documents. Specifically in one incidence, they requested 
that he secretly prepare and record for Ellen Haycock an Affidavit of Surviving Joint Tenant of 
Obed and Ellen Haycock's Residence to eliminate the other heirs from receiving their shares of 
this Residence as Obed Haycock had provided in the "Restated Trust Agreement" Attorney 
Narrvel E. Hall had prepared for him and which he executed on April 5, 1983. 
(b) Rule I. 7 Conflict of Interest. 
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall clandestinely counseled and represented Ellen Haycock 
and her daughter Bonnie Kaufman in matters adverse to the rights of the other heirs; and, to Obed 
Haycock's testamentary documents under which his estate was to be administered. These 
consultations and related matters were kept secret from the Personal Representative of Obed 
Haycock's Estate and all of his children. 
1 
31 
(c). Rule 1.6 ( \)iiflicl of Interest; Prohibited Transactions. 
For a fee that was kept secret from Obcd Haycock's Personal Representative and 
all of his children, Attorney Narrvel E. Hall clandestinely accepted employment from Ellen 
Haycock and her daughter Bonnie Kaufman to secretly prepare a legal document adverse to the 
other heirs of the Estate of Obcd 1 laycock. He prepared this document at the time he was legal 
counsel for this Estate. 
Defendant Narrvel Hall and Senior Pattncr of the Law Firm of RAY, QUINNEY 
& NEBEKER, Attorney Albert Bowen, represented Ellen Haycock and Bonnie Kaufman from 
April, 1984 to November 1984 after the Petsonal Representative ofObed C. Haycock's Estate, 
Ralph II. Haycock, informed Attorney Narrvel E. Hall on April 3, 1984 that this Law Firm's 
icprcsentation of this Estate was terminated. However, from April 3, 1984 through November 2, 
1984 they continued providing legal service to Ellen Haycock and Bonnie Kaufman and charged 
these services to this Estate. Of the 7.70 hours this Law Firm charged to this Estate during this 
period, 6.70 hours were for legal services exclusively provided Ellen Haycock and Bonnie 
Kaufman and alleged consultation with Senior Partner Albeit Bowen - all without the presence or 
knowledge of Obed Haycock's Personal Representative or any of his children. After allegedly 
administering the probate of this Estate for a year - this Law Fifm failed to take the appropriate 
action to close probate. 
FACTUAL SUMMARY 
The complainant Don II. Haycock is an attorney licensed by the State of California 
and authorized by the State Bar of Utah to represent a bother and two sisters in pro has vice in 
two lawsuits he filed in the Utah Third District Court regarding the administration of the Estate of 
his father, Obcd C. 1 laycock In these lawsuits he is representing as plaintiffs four of the five 
children of Obcd C. Haycock from his fust wife that died in 1963; Richard O. Haycock, Mary 
Lois Porter (Lois Porter), Jean Smith and himself, Don H. Haycock, in pro se. 
The defendants are the Estate of Ellen S. Haycock, Obed C. Haycock's second 
wife that died in 1999, and her only child Bonnie L. Kaufman. 
One lawsuit concerns the inheritance rights to Obed and Ellen Haycock's 
Residence that they occupied before their deaths. Specifically at issue is whether these parties 
held title to the Residence as tenauts-in-cornmon or as joint tenants. They took title as joint 
tenants when they acquired the Residence in 1964. However, to save on estate taxes, in 1979 
they deeded the Residence to themselves as tenants-in-common but did not record the deed. At a 
April 20, 2000 hearing on defendants' motions for summary judgment, the court held that the 
because the tenancy-in-common deed was not recorded, the joint tenancy deed prevailed. 
Defendants' attorneys were informed that the court's ruling would be appealed. 
2 
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In June 1979 the Law Firm of RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER prepared 
reciprocal wills and trusts for Ellen and Obed Haycock that provided for all of their children to 
receive and equal distribution from both of their estates. They selected this Law Firm because 
Ellen Haycock had known Senior Partner Albert Bowen for, ". . . a long time, long, long time" 
and, Mr. Bowen was a friend of Ellen Haycock's deceased husband. 
On May 2, 1979 Attorney Herbert Livsey of RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER was 
told by Obed Haycock that title to their Residence was to be changed from joint tenancy to 
tenancy-in-common because of the adverse estate and income tax consequences of having the 
Residence in joint tenancy. Obed 1 laycock specifically communicated to Livsey, "go for estate 
tax savings." Accordingly, Attorney Livsey prepared the tenancy-in-common deed to which Obed 
and Ellen Haycock's signatures were acknowledged before a notary public. 
In March 1983 Obed and Ellen Haycock requested the Law Firm of RAY, 
QUINNEY & NEBEKER to revise their reciprocal wills and trusts. Attorney Narrvel E. Hall was 
assigned this task and their "Restated" reciprocal wills and trusts were executed on April 5, 1983. 
The trusts were based on Obed and Ellen Haycock holding title to their Residence as fenants-in-
common and not as joint tenants so that after Obed Haycock's death his share of the Residence 
would go to Ellen Haycock for life an then to a family trust for distribution to his children and 
Bonnie Kaufman in equal shares. Ellen Haycock's "Restaicd^fust Agreement" had the same 
reciprocal provisions. Attorney Narrvel E Hall testified in his deposition that he prepared the 
Obed and Ellen Haycock \s "Restated Trust Agreements" so that their Residence could be 
divided between thenu 
Attorney Hall had been told that Obed Haycock had had multiple strokes and was 
in poor health. He died in December of that year. The Law Firm of RAY, QUINNEY & 
NEBEKER was then retained by Obed Haycock's Personal Representative, Ralph H. Haycock, to 
administer both the probate of his estate and his Restated Trust Agreement. Attorney Narrvel E. 
Hall was assigned this task. He had prepared the "Restated Trust Agreements" that Obed and 
Ellen Haycock executed on April 5, 1983. 
In January 1984 Attorney Narrvel E. Hall provided documentation to Obed 
Haycock's Personal Representative indicating that Obed and Ellen Haycock in 1979 had deeded 
their Residence to themselves as tenants-in-common to reduce estate taxes. This was consistent 
with the provisions in their restated trusts and wills that Attorney Narrvel E. Hall had prepared for 
them. 
On March 22, 1984 Attorney Narrvel E. Hall - while employed by Obed 
Haycock's Personal Representative to administer the Obed C. Haycock Estate - received the 
following telephone message from Bonnie Kaufman via his secretary: 
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"Obed Haycock, title in mother \s name, no quit claim 
I the tenancy-in-common deed] recorded. Please do not 
mention to any member of the family. Mother wants it forgotten. " 
Attorney Narrvcl E. I lall testified in his deposition that prior to March 22, 1984, 
he had two telephone conversations with Bonnie Kaufman that consumed forty-eight minutes 
regarding this tenancy-in-common deed. 
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall testified in his deposition that on, or about, March 21, 
1984 in a telephone conversation with Bonnie Kaufman, he stated that he was going to resolve 
how title to Obed and Ellen Haycock's Residence was held by referring to their 1979 Federal Gift 
Tax Return. This 1979 Federal Gift Tax Return he referred to indicated that Obed and Ellen 
Haycock held title to their Residence as tenants-in-common. 
Disregarding this evidence - and while employed by Personal Representative of 
Obed Haycock's Estate - Attorney Narrvel E. Hall clandestinely prepared and recorded an 
Affidavit of Surviving Joint Tenant for Ellen Haycock based on the 1964 joint tenancy deed. He 
did this without informing the Obed Haycock's Personal Representative or any of his children. 
This Affidavit of Surviving Joint Tenant was notfdtecovered by any of Obed 
Haycock's children until the Summer of 1998 when Richard Haycock, one of Obed's sons, 
discovered it in the records of the Salt Lake County Recorder. This lawsuit followed. 
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall claims he prepared the Affidavit of Surviving Joint 
Tenant base on his rough hand-written notes of alleged conversations between the "Haycocks and 
Senior Partner Albert Bowcn on Match 15, 1983 and an alleged telephone conversation with 
Obed Haycock on March 29, 1983. 
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall testified in his deposition that he did not inform Obed 
Haycock's Personal Representative and Obed Haycock's children of the 1979 tenancy-in-common 
deed to Obed and Ellen Haycock's Residence until after this lawsuit was filed in 1998 and a copy 
of this tcnancy-in-common deed was produced pursuant to a discovery demand. 
Attorney Narrvel E. Hall testified in his deposition that he intentionally prepared 
Obed and Ellen Haycock's reciprocal "Restated Trust Agreements'1 for the survivor to have a life 
estate in the Residence, with the remainder going into a family trust for the children, because 
"they might later decide that the tax risk warranted severing joint tenancy." Also, he testified that 
he was informed in February 1983, or thereabouts, that Obed Haycock had recently suffered 
strokes and felt these strokes were indications of his imminent death. 
4 
CONCLUSION 
Although these charges of attorney misconduct go back to 1984, they were not 
discovered until 1998 because this Law Firm and Attorney Narrvel E. Hall kept secret this 
misconduct from the children of Obed C. Haycock. They believed in 1984 that this misconduct 
would never be discovered because they knew that their co-conspirators — Ellen Haycock and 
Bonnie Kaufman ~ would not reveal this conduct because they were the beneficiaries of it. 
These charges aic irrelevant to the legal issue of how Obed and Ellen Haycock 
held title to their Residence at the time of their respective death, either as joint tenants or as 
tenants-in-common. Ethical misconduct is not subservient to arbitrary time constraints like 
statutes of limitations. Rather ethical misconduct go directly and completely to one's character 
for honesty because a persons character traits are repeated over that person's lifetime. 
In March 1983, three months after Obed Haycock's death, this Law Firm and its 
attorney Narrvel E. Hall abrogated their sworn commitment to faithfully honor and obey the Rules 
of Professional Responsibility of the Utah Bar. Although they were retained to represent Obed 
Haycock's Personal Representative in the administration of his Estate and Restated Trust 
Agreement - their allegiance shifted from probating this Estate to secretly promoting the desires 
and interests of Ellen Haycock and Bonnie Kaufman at th'6 expense of the other heirs to Obed 
Haycock's Estate. After a year there was little, if any, meaningful effort to probate this Estate. 
Had this Law Firm, its senior partner Albert Bowen and Attorney Narrvel E. Hall, 
elected instead to comply with the Utah Rules of Professional Conduct that they swore to obey, 
they would have informed Obed Haycock's Personal Representative of this tenancy-in-common 
deed - that Ellen Haycock and Bonnie Kaufman asked them to keep secret from Obed Haycock's 
family - and provide him with a copy. 1 lad they taken this course, in 1984 this issue could have 
been expeditiously and inexpensively resolved by a single declaratory judgment on evidence and 
memory that has now disappeared and been forgotten. The cost in attorney fees and court costs 
incurred to date to resolve this issue after 1998 is considerable mid continuing to mount. 
Accordingly, the Utah State Bar is respectfully requested to discourage this 
practice by sternly condemning this conduct by its disciplinary ruling. 












AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF DON II. HAYCOCK 
1 I am DON H HAYCOCK the plaintififin this lawsuit AJthough I am 
appearing as a pro se litigant, I am an attorney admitted to practice before all courts in California, 
the Federal Courts, and the Supreme Court of the United States I have practiced in all of these 
courts and have pending cases in the California Courts and the Ninth Federal Circuit. I make this 
affidavit in support of the incorporated POINTS AND AUTHORITIES submitted in opposition 
to defendants motion for a protective order from discovery I am one of the sons of decedent 
9 II OBED C HAYCOCK (hereafter "OBED") and an heir to his estate 
10 2 OBED'S wife died in 1964 and he married his second wife ELLEN S. LYON 
11 (hereafter "ELLEN") soon thereafter ELLEN brought into the marriage $21,000 that went 
12 towards the purchase of their home He died on December 12, 1983 leaving as heirs his widow 
13 ELLEN, her daughter BONNIE L KAUFMAN (hereafter "BONNIE") and five children from his 
14 first marriage, JEAN, LOIS, RALPH, RICHARD and plaintiff. After OBED'S first wife died, 
15 his five children signed over to him all inheritance rights they had to all properties in their 
16 mother's estate. 
17 3 In 1979 OBED and ELLEN executed reciprocal wills and living trusts that 
18 included a Marital QTIP Trust, funded by OBED'S estate, from which ELLEN would receive the 
19 I income for life with the principle then going to OBED'S children and BONNIE in equal shares 
20 OBED'S ranch was to be sold and the proceeds distributed in equal shares to his children and 
21 BONNIE after his death His testamentary documents included a provision that if ELLEN later 
22 disinherited his children in favor of BONNIE then BONNIE would be excluded from sharing in 
23 the QTIP Trust and Ranch From 1997 up to OBED'S death in 1983, he continually gave 
24 ELLEN taxable assets, e g securities and money, to shield his estate from federal estate tax. 
25 Based on letters from ELLEN'S attorney and BONNIE during 1997, that solicited distribution of 
26 the QTIP Trust, ELLEN'S estate in 1997 approached one-million dollars ELLEN ad been giving 
27 away portions of her estate to BONNIE and other parties in order to reduce the estate taxes 
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1 4 During the Christmas season of 1982, OBED told me that he was concerned 
2 that ELLEN could possible out-live what he provided for her in his 1979 will and trust He ask 
3 me to prepare the necessary testamentary documents that would give her total and unfettered 
4 | access to all of his assets during her life, and then what was left was to go the his children and 
5 BONNIE in equal shares He told me that the QUIP Trust was to be eliminated but, as previously 
6 devised, the proceeds from the sale of the Ranch was to go to his children and BONNIE in equal 
7 shares immediately following his death 
8 5 1 told him that the only way to accomplish this objective would by with 
9 reciprocal wills and a contract between him and ELLEN that could be enforced against either one 
10 of them that later decided to disinherit the others1 children He did not favor a contract between 
11 him and ELLEN because he told me that they had promised and covenanted with each other that 
12 she would not disinherit his children after his death, he trusted her and did not want to do 
13 anything that could imply a distrust and worried that such a contract would imply that he 
14 distrusted her However he did not trust BONNIE and worried that she could adversely influence 
15 ELLEN during her declining years I told him that I would prepare the contract in the most 
16 friendly and non-threatening manner possible Since it was always their expressed intentions to 
17 distribute their combined estates to all of their children equally, the contract I prepared just 
18 reasserts this expressed intention in contractual language, i e "Ellen's testamentary provisions for 
19 Obed's children being given in consideration for Obed's testamentary provisions for Ellen's 
20 surviving child Bonnie " This "memorandum" is attached hereto an titled MEMORANDUM OF 
21 CHANGE IN TESTAMENTARY PLAN (hereafter "memorandum'1) The change mostly being 
22 the reciprocal wills that elimination of the trusts — not the expressed intentions of the parties 
23 6 Before preparing these documents, I contacted all of my brothers and sisters 
24 and explained how our father OBED wanted to change the distribution of his estate so that 
25 ELLEN'S could have access to substantially all of his estate during her life, and that they would 




1 || though a substantial portion of OBED'S estate came from his first wife and his children's mother 
2 || 7. In February 1983 I prepared and sent to OBED and ELLEN reciprocal wills 
3 || and the "memorandum" along with instructions for their signing of these wills After receiving 
4 || these documents they called me and we had a three-way conversation. Both expressed 
5 II satisfaction with these documents and both expressed to me that they were ready to sign them. I 
6 told them that their signing of the wills had to be witnessed. There was some confusion as to who 
7 these witnesses could be and after this conversation I called my brother RICHARD O. 
8 HAYCOCK and ask him to go to their house and help them execute the wills. 
9 8. Approximately a week later, OBED telephoned and said that ELLEN had 
10 taken the wills and "memorandum" to a Utah attorney and was told by this attorney that these 
11 documents were "worthless" and, "would be thrown out of court." However, when ELLEN 
12 picked up on another phone, she stated that it was BONNIE and not her that had taken these 
13 documents to a Utah attorney and she was just repeating what BONNIE had told her. I then 
14 informed both of them that I would be in Salt Lake City the following morning to visit this 
15 attorney and requested his name No name was provided at that time. OBED expressed outrage 
16 to ELLEN for now expressing a different explanation from what he claims she told him; and also 
17 that BONNIE had clandestinely without his permission or knowledge interfered. That same day 
18 he alone called me back and said he had made an appointment with a Utah attorney for the 
19 following morning and told me not to come to Salt Lake City. 
20 9. Subsequently these wills and the "memorandum" were reviewed by Utah 
21 attorney Hal N. Swenson in a five (5) page letter dated March 23, 1983. A copy of this letter has 
22 been served on defendants' attorneys Also, these wills and the "memorandum" were reviewed by 
23 attorney Narrvel Hall in his three (3) letter of February 9, 1984 to OBED'S executor and trustee 
24 RALPH H. HAYCOCK. A copy of this letter has also been served on defendants' attorneys. 
25 Additionally, these attorneys have been served with a five (5) page hand written memorandum by 





















testamentary documents prepared by plaintiff This memorandum is a copy of an original that was 
in attorney Norrvel Hall's file and produced pursuant to a motion to produce documents 
I, DON H. HAYCOCK, being sworn, state that 1 am a son of decedent OBED C 
HAYCOCK and an heir to his estate I affirm and swear that this declaration, consisting of 
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MEMORANDUM O f CHANGE IN TESTAMENTARY TLAN 
On June 28, 1979 we signed and had witnessed our first testamentary 
documents that consisted of both mutual and reciprocal wills and trusts. 
Because of gifts that were later made of a portion of the testamentary 
property we have prepared new wills, and cancelled the trusts, for the purpose of 
accomplishing our common and joint testamentary plan that has never changed or from 
which we have never intended to deviate. 
On February , 1983, we (Ellen and Obed) signed and had witnesses our 
new Wills. Our mutual desire has always been that Obed's children and Ellen's children 
share equally and without distinction in the estates of both of us. Accordingly, our Wills 
of Juno 28, 1979, and the supplementary written Trust Agreements, were both mutual and 
reciprocal In the furtherance of this common testamentary plan. 
Although those written Trust Agreements are now cancelled, this Is not to 
be interpreted in any way as a change to our common testamentary plan. All children are 
to share equally and without distinction in both of our estates. Ellen's testarncntai y 
provisions for Obed's children being given in consldeiation tor Obed's testamentary 
provisions for Ellen's surviving child Bonnie. 
Dated: February ,1983 
Ellen S. Haycock 
Obed C. Haycock 
Witnesses: 
Subscribed, sworn to and acknowledged before me, by Obed C. and Ellen 5. Haycock, and 
subscribed to before rnc by and , witnesses, this 
day of February, 1983. 
Notary Public 
Residing in Salt Lake County, Utah 
My Commission expires: 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
* * * 
RICHARD O. HAYCOCK, MARY 
LOIS PORTER, MARTHA JEAN 
SMITH and DON H. HAYCOCK, 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RALPH H. HAYCOCK, TRUSTEE 
OF THE OBED C. HAYCOCK 
TRUST; BONNIE L. KAUFMAN, 
INDIVIDUALLY, BONNIE L. 
KAUFMAN, EXECUTRIX OF THE 
ELLEN S. HAYCOCK ESTATE, 
AND AS BENEFICIARY TO THE 
OBED C. HAYCOCK TRUST; 
and DOES 1 THROUGH 10, 
INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
Case NO. 98-0910696PR 
Deposition of: 
NARRVEL E. HALL 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Monday, the 9th 
day of August, 1999, commencing at the hour of 9:10 a.m., 
the deposition of NARRVEL E. HALL, produced as a witness 
at the instance and request of the Plaintiffs in the 
above-entitled action before the above-named Court, was 
taken before Jill Dunford, a Certified Shorthand 
Reporter, Utah License No. 244, and Notary Public in and 
for the State of Utah, at the offices of Depomax 
Reporting Services, 525 Wells Fargo Plaza, 170 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah. 
REPORTING SERVICES, INC 
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1 A That's a photocopy of my notes dated March 
2 28th, 1983, and March 29th, 1983, representing 
3 instructions received in telephone calls from 
4 Mrs. Haycock and then from Mr. Haycock respectively on 
5 those dates. 
6 Q Thank you. Let me hand you what has been 
7 marked as Deposition Exhibit 12. Do you recognize that 
8 document? 
9 A I do. This is a photocopy of my notes of 
10 conference, they are in two parts, but dated the same 
11 day, March 15th, 1983. Both sets of notes purport to 
12 represent my notes from conferences of that date with 
13 Obed and Ellen Haycock and Albert Bowen. 
14 (Exhibit Nos. 13 and 14 were 
15 marked for identification.) 
16, Q All right. Thank you. Let me hand you what 
17 has been marked as Deposition Exhibits 13 and 14. Are 
18 those documents that were produced from Ray, Quinney & 
19 Nebeker's estate planning files for Ellen and Obed 
20 Haycock? 
21 A Yes. 
22 Q Could you identify those documents? 
23 A Exhibit 13 is a photocopy of a file copy of a 
24 letter dated August 10th, 1979 addressed to Obed C. 
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C E R T I F I E D C O P Y 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DON H. HAYCOCK, 
Plaintiff, 
vs . 
ELLEN S. HAYCOCK, THE 
ESTATE OF ELLEN S. 
HAYCOCK, BONNIE L. 
KAUFMAN (aka BONNIE L. 
LYON); AND DOES 1 THRU 
10, INCLUSIVE, 
Defendants. 
Civil No. 98-0910696PR 
Judge Homer Wilkinson 
DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF 
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first request for production of documents, I can't 
find them. So the copies that I just received 
would be the first opportunity I've had to look at 
them recently. 
Q Do you recall that they requested any 
change that had to do with a provision that was in 
their earlier trusts -- Ifm talking about the 
reciprocal trusts -- that if one of them were to 
disinherit the other's children, then that child --
then that -- the other party had the right to 
disinherit that child of that person? 
A No. As a matter of fact, my 
recollection would be quite the contrary, that I --
I believe their instructions were that the survivor 
should have the right to disinherit any of either 
children for any reason at all as to the assets of 
that individual, and I believe we had a discussion 
about that. I -- I recommend to my elderly clients 
that they retain that kind of power because the 
dynamics of a family change after one of the 
parents die. 
Q Okay. 
A And I believe it's advisable for the 
survivor to have that kind of power. 
MR. HAYCOCK: Okay. I object to that 
SUSETTE M. SNIDER -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
last question. It was nonresponsive. 
Q Let me refer you to the letter of 
February 9, 1994. I think thatfs Exhibit 7. And 
Ifm referring to the second paragraph on the second 
page. And let me read it for the record, and 
follow along to make sure I read it correctly. 
Starting with the underlined First. It says,. 
First, they both made it very clear 
that, while Ellen fully intended to treat her 
daughter, Bonnie, and Obed!s children equally, her 
assets were her own and she was not to be under any 
legal disability with respect to their use, 
management or disposition. Obed stated that he was 
satisfied with an arrangement that adopted only the 
residue of his own --
A I believe you missed a word there, 
"which protected." 
Q I'm sorry. -- which protected only the 
residue of his own assets for the children, and he 
did not in any way want the children to be in a 
position to interfere in any way with Ellen's use 
or management of those assets which were in her own 
name. The implication clearly was that if any of 
Obed's children should treat Ellen badly during the 
period she might survive Obed, she would be free to 
SUSETTE M. SNIDER -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
1 disinherit those children with respect to those 
2 assets which she separately owned and controlled. 
3 You state that there was an 
4 implication. How did you conclude that there was 
5 an implication from her statement that she intended 
6 to treat all children equally as expressed in this 
7 letter? 
8 A I believe the reference to the 
9 implication refers to not the intention to treat 
10 them equally but the possibility that she might 
11 choose not to. 
12 Q Well, how did you arrive that that was 
13 implied in their mutual plan for these estate 
14 documents? In other words, what was expressed to 
15 you that led you to believe there was an 
16 implication here that Ellen could disinherit Obed's 
17 children if they weren't good to her? 
18 A We specifically discussed that issue. 
19 Q Do you recall specifically what was, 
20 said? 
21 A No more than what this says, that --
22 that -- we discussed the possibility that they 
23 could create a joint and contractual plan of 
24 disposition which would bind each of them not to 
25 change it following the death of the other. I, 
SUSETTE M. SNIDER CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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1 frankly, recommended that they not pursue that 
2 course. 
3 Q So you don't recall any specific 
4 expressions that caused you to make this 
5 implication, it was just something you assumed from 
6 the entire --
7 MR. PAYNE: Objection, to the extent 
8 that's a mischaracterization of the witness's 
9 testimony. 
10 THE WITNESS: My testimony would be 
11 that I recommended that they reserve to each of 
12 them the right to make those kinds of decisions 
13 following the death of the other and that they 
14 accepted my recommendation. 
15 Q (By Mr. Haycock) So you're saying that 
16 the implication was from what you expressed to 
17 them? 
18 A That's right. 
19 Q And did they seem to assent to that, 
20 assent to what you expressed to them? 
21 A They -- they understood what I 
22 expressed to them, and they told me that they 
23 wanted an arrangement that provided that kind of 
24 flexibility to the survivor. 
25 Q Okay. Now, early in this -- earlier in 
SUSETTE M. SNIDER -- CAPITOL REPORTERS 
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C PRESTON ALLEN 0921 19711 
April 11, 1979 
Mr. & Mrs. Obed C. Haycock 
3390 South 2700 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84109 
Dear Mr. & Mrs. Haycock: 
Please find enclosed herewith copies of the following 
documents: 
1. Last Will and Testament of Obed C. Haycock. 
2. Last Will and Testament of Ellen S. Haycock. 
3. Trust Agreement, Obed C. Haycock, Trustor and 
Ralph Hugh Haycock, Trustee. 
4. Trust Agreement, Ellen S. Haycock, Trustor and 
Ralph Hugh Haycock, Trustee. 
The documents reflect changes in the federal estate tax 
laws as well as the Utah Code. The trust documents, however, 
retain the provisions that relate ttTfche distribution t6 youx 
Tespecftive cHuaren. —~ "~~ 
The following schedule is, I believe, an accurate summary 
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I understand you have no life insurance policies and no pension or 
profit sharing benefits. I also understand that Mrs, Haycock 
contributed approximately one-half of the purchase price of the 
residence. 
In general, the estate plan is drafted to take advantage 
of the marital deduction in Mr. Haycock's estate allowed under the 
amended federal estate tax laws. Article IV of the Trust Agree-
ment provides for the marital deduction portion to be held in 
trust for Mrs. Haycock. The trust provisions require the net 
income to be paid out to Mrs. Haycock. In addition, the principal 
or assets of the trust are to be distributed to Mrs. Haycock as 
necessary for her proper maintenance and support, to maintain the 
standard of living to which she is accustomed and to meet her 
extraordinary expenses arising out of illness, accident or other 
emergency. In addition, she has a general testamentary power of 
appointment over all the assets of the marital trust. 
Pursuant to the formula set forth in Article X of the 
trust, the amount allocated to the marital share will be approxi-
mately $153,000.00 calculated as follows: 
Mr. Haycock 
Gross Estate approx. $300,000.00 
Less: Exemption Equivalent (1979) 147,333.00 
Balance 152,667.00 
Marital Deduction 152,667.00 
Taxable Estate -0-
By 1981 and thereafter, the exemption equivalent will be 
$175,625.00 and, therefore, the marital deduction will be 
approximately $124,375.00. 
While the marital deduction will be between $150,000,00 
and $125,000.00 the amount held in the marital deduction trust 
(Article IV) will only be approximately $20,000.00 to $50,000.00 
because the balance of the marital deduction, or approximately 
$104,000.00 will pass to Mrs. Haycock pursuant to the joint 
tenancy ownership of the residence and various stocks. 
The exclusion of the assets held in the family trust from 
Mrs. Haycock's estate is the crucial feature of the estate plan in 
terms of tax savings. In other words, the assets passing to the 
family trust are not taxed in Mr. Haycock's estate because of the 
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exemption ($147,333.00 (1969) to $175,625.00 (1981)) and then also 
pass free of estate taxes in Mrs. Haycock's estate because the 
assets of the family trust are not included in her estate. 
If Mrs. Haycock were to predecease Mr. Haycock the estate 
tax results would not be as favorable. This is because all the 
joint tenancy property would pass to Mr. Haycock to be included in 
his estate. Thus, his estate would total approximately 
$350,000.00 and would result in an estate tax of approximately 
$52,000.00. To eliminate or reduce this tax, it is necessary that 
we transfer assets from joint tenancy to your respective names so 
that if Mrs. Haycock predeceases Mr. Haycock, her will and trust 
will produce a result similar to the will and trust for Mr. 
Haycock; i.e., her assets go into a family trust to be held for 
the benefit of Mr. Haycock but not to be included in his estate at 
his subsequent death. Therefore, we suggest that you transfer and 
divide the stock held in joint tenancy one-half to Mr. Haycock and 
one-half to Mrs. Haycock. This would place approximately 
$32,000.00 in value in her name. In addition, we would suggest 
that Mr. Haycock make an additional gift to Mrs. Haycock of 
approximately $70,000.00 in corporate stocks. This would bring 
Mrs. Haycock's estate up to approximately $100,000.00 and result 
in the following analysis: 
Husband dies first (1979) 
Husband's gross estate 
Federal Estate Tax 
Distribution from his 
estate to wife 
Wife dies ten years later (1989) 
Wife's gross estate 
Own assets Joint Tenancy 
Residence 
Gift from Husband 
Held in Marital 
Deduction Trust 
No Gift 
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Thus if Mr. Haycock dies first, there is only a small 
reduction in the estate tax savings from a current gift to Mrs. 
Haycock of $70,000.00. But if Mrs. Haycock dies first, there is a 
tax savings as illustrated by the following example. 
$70,000 Gift plus 
$30,000 Joint 
Wife dies first (1979) No Gift Tenancy Split 
Wife's gross estate 
Residence $ 40,000.00 $ 40,000.00 
Split of Joint 30,000.00 
Gift from husband -0- 70,000.00 
TOTAL $ 40,000.00 $140,000.00 
Federal Estate Tax -0- -0-
Husband dies ten years later (1988) 
Husband's gross estate 350,000.00 250,000.00 
Federal Estate Tax 37,200.00 21,400.00 
Thus, the estate tax savings at the subsequent death of 
Mr. Haycock, with a prior gift of $70,000.00 to Mrs. Haycock and 
the proposed planning, would equal approximately $16,000.00. 
Based upon the above examples, it seems appropriate to advise that 
Mr. Haycock make a gift to Mrs. Haycock of approximately 
$70,000.00 and that the joint tenancy in stocks be split. 
I have discussed with you the problem with your resi-
dence. If the joint tenancy of the residence were split into 
equal ownership by each of you, the estate tax savings would be 
approximately $11,800.00 in the second example and approximately 
$5,900.00 would be available in the first example. The problem 
with splitting the ownership is that after the first spouse dies 
one-half of the residence would be held in the family trust and 
probably not qualify for the $100,000.00 exclusion from income 
taxation upon the sale of a residence. Thus, if the surviving 
spouse were to desire to sell the residence, the exclusion would 
only apply to one-half of the residence. With the current 
uncertainty in the law regarding the carryover basis rules, it is 
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difficult to guess how significant an income tax problem may be 
presented by having one-half of a residence in a family trust. 
I would suggest we discuss the transfer of the residence 
from joint tenancy to one-half ownership as tenants in common. If 
you decide to make the change, we will need to add one paragraph 
to the trust agreement outlining the provisions relating to the 
residence in the trust. 
This letter is only intended as an overview of your 
estate plan. After you have read the documents, I'm sure you will 
have some questions. I have given you copies of the documents 
rather than the originals so you may underline words or write 
questions in the margins, etc. I think we should get together and 
answer your questions and discuss the ownership of your assets 
after you have reviewed this letter and the documents. 
Sincerely, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 




PROOF OF SERVICE 
I am a resident of the State of California, over the age of eighteen years, My 
business address is Don H. Haycock and Associates, 7321 Westlawn Avenue, Los Angeles, 
California 90045. On July 17, 20001 served the following described document, 
APPELLANT RELY BRIEF 
Court of Appeal Case No. CA 990833 
By placing the document listed above in sealed envelope and addressed as stated 
on the following page. I then caused these envelopes with first class postage thereon fully paid 
and placed in the United States mail in Los Angeles, California in compliance with California 
Code of Civ. Proc. 1013 and 2015.5: Code of Federal Civ. Proc. 5(b) or FRAP 25(d); 1 and Rule 5 
of the Utah Rules of Court.. 
I DECLARE UNDER PENALTY OF PERJURY UNDER THE LAWS OF 
CALIFORNIA, OF UTAH AND OF THE UNITED STATES THAT THE ABOVE IS TRUE 
AND CORRECT; AND THAT THIS DECLARATION WAS EXECUTED IN LOS ANGELES 
COUNTY, STATE OF CALIFORNIA 
Dated: July 17, 2000 
JENNIFER M ERRANDE 
Thomas Chnstensen, Jr Esquire (2 copies). 
Douglas J. Payne, Esquire 
FABIAN & CLENDENIN 
P.O. Box 510210 
215 South State Street, 12,h Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84151-0210 
Mr. John A. Adams, Esquire 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER 
79 South Main Street 
P.O. Box 45385 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 - 0385 
Ronald Ady, Esquire 
51 West Center Street, Suite 172 
Orem, Utah 80457 
Mr. Michael L. Deamer, Esquire 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR, ROMRELL &LEE 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
